

## CHAPTER V

### **CASE STUDIES OF REPATRIATION IN AFRICA**

The typology introduced in the previous chapter provides four categories for classifying refugee repatriations. In order to test the veracity of both the typology of repatriation (summarized in Figure 4.3) and the model of information and decision-making (summarized in Figure 3.2), it is necessary to apply these models to cases in the real world. To this end, this chapter presents four case studies of African refugee return migration. For each case, a brief outline of the origins of the refugee situation is provided. Then the *social* and *external contexts* are examined to determine the economic, social and security conditions of the refugees, as well as the process by which the refugees receive information about their home areas. Following this analysis, the return migrations are classified according to the new typology of repatriation.

Four examples of African repatriation have been selected: Ethiopian returnees from Djibouti in 1983, the 1989 Namibian repatriation exercise, the return migration to Somalia from Kenya in 1993-94, and the major Mozambican repatriation of 1994. These four cases were selected in order to fill certain criteria. Because the question of *voluntariness* of repatriation is a relatively recent phenomenon, all the cases, except for that of Djibouti occurred during the last seven years. In addition, there are several detailed sources in the literature for each of the cases, providing a broad spectrum of interpretations and analyses. Finally, the cases provide a good sample of the diverse variety of repatriation that occurs on the African continent. The cases represent repatriations into safe areas and conflict zones, organized as well as spontaneous

repatriations. There is one example of repatriation following colonial independence and three cases of repatriation during or following an internal conflict.

### **THE 1983 DJIBOUTI REPATRIATION**


Refugees began arriving in the small east African state of Djibouti even before it gained its independence from France in 1977. The refugees were fleeing the Ogaden war, that was started when Somalia attempted to take control of the Ogaden region of eastern Ethiopia in 1977. At independence, the new state of Djibouti was home to some 3,000 refugees (Crisp 1984b, p. 74). By 1983, there were an estimated 30,000 refugees in Djibouti, which represented nearly ten percent of the total population of Djibouti (Goodwin-Gill 1989, p. 265).

The majority of the early refugees from the Ogaden were of Issa ethnicity. Many had fled to Djibouti in order to settle among people of similar ethnic background. The new state of Djibouti was founded on a fine balance between the dominant Issa population (about sixty percent) and the minority Afars (about forty percent). The sudden influx of refugees who were part of the dominant ethnic group in Djibouti threatened to undermine the tenuous stability of the new nation (Crisp 1984b, p. 73). In addition to supplying refugees, the Ogaden war also had a devastating affect on the fledgling economy of Djibouti. Having few natural resources and little arable land, the nation was economically dependent on its rail link with Ethiopia. The war had disrupted rail and land traffic through the port of Djibouti, seriously damaging the economy.

#### **Social Context**

During the initial period before 1982, most refugees settled in and around the only city, Djibouti. The refugees were provided little assistance by the government, while at the same time they were not permitted to work legally (Phillips 1983a, p. 3). Many refugees were forced to seek illegal employment in the informal sector in order to

**Figure 5.1 Djibouti, Ethiopia and Somalia 1983**



Sources: UNHCR 1982, p. 30; Editions Jeune Afrique 1973, p. 234

make enough money to feed themselves. During this early period, UNHCR was hampered in its efforts to protect the refugees. While Djibouti had signed the 1951 *Convention*, the UNHCR feared that the government might renounce its signature if pressed too hard on the matter of protection. The UNHCR allowed several refugees to be forcibly returned to Ethiopia without official complaint to the government of Djibouti.

After an initial period, where the refugees settled mostly in the urban fringe, the government of Djibouti decided to remove refugees from the city and confine them in rural camps. Thousands of refugees were rounded up and resettled in isolated and un-serviced camps, many of which were only ten kilometres from the Ethiopian frontier (Aitchison 1983, p. 48). Those refugees that remained in the city were forced to go ‘underground’ in order to escape detection by the authorities.

Many of the refugees had fled Ethiopia together and were settled with their families. Kinship ties between refugees were generally maintained. While many of the refugees were of Issa ethnicity, this did not necessarily improve their standing in Djibouti. For the most part the refugees were perceived as ‘foreigners’ by locals in the country. The refugees were a reminder to many of the continuing privation placed on Djibouti by the Ogaden conflict.

The refugees’ social contexts were further controlled by the imposition of identity-card regulations. Most early refugees were granted refugee status upon arrival. After the refugees had been confined in camps, new refugees were forced to apply individually for asylum, which was frequently not granted. These refugees were then classified as ‘illegal’ migrants, who were subject to deportation.

### **External Context**

The complexity of the relationship between Ethiopia and its neighbours had a direct effect on the manner in which the Ogaden refugees in Djibouti were treated. In

the early 1980s, Ethiopia's government, the *Dergue* had become notorious throughout Africa. The government's violent and disruptive internal policies had alienated and frightened a large proportion of the Ethiopian population. By 1980, one out of every two refugees in Africa had fled from Ethiopia. The large number of refugees had become a significant embarrassment to the Ethiopian government. The refugees were a source of information about the deteriorating conditions inside the country; and some refugees used their asylum states as bases for attacks against the Ethiopian regime (Aitchison 1983, p. 48). In order to entice refugees to return, in June 1980 the Ethiopian government declared an amnesty for all refugees, inviting them to return home without fear of reprisal (Goodwin-Gill 1989, p. 265).

As noted previously, the Ogaden war and the arrival of a large number of Issa refugees in Djibouti had serious ramifications on the nation's internal politics. In order not to inflame the simmering conflict with the minority Afar population, the government, which was controlled by Issas was determined to put an end to the refugee situation. The inhabitants of refugee camps were continually harassed. Threats were frequently made against the refugees, they were made to feel very unwelcome. In most refugee camps, periodic searches and threats of forcible return to Ethiopia were used to keep the refugees on edge. From non-government sources came a report of fourteen refugees who had been forcibly returned to Ethiopia and were summarily executed (Crisp 1984b, p. 76).

In early 1983, the governments of Djibouti and Ethiopia and the UNHCR entered into a Tripartite agreement to facilitate the voluntary repatriation of refugees (Phillips 1983, p. 5). The agreement provided for the safe, orderly and voluntary return of refugees to Ethiopia. While the government of Djibouti was preparing to implement the voluntary repatriation program, at the same time it was beginning a series of deportations of refugees. Refugees were rounded up and forced into railway box-cars for the journey home to Ethiopia (Crisp 1984b, p. 76). Despite these disturbing events,

UNHCR was determined to continue with the repatriation exercise. The Djibouti refugee situation had become a test-case for UNHCR. In the eyes of UNHCR, repatriation was emerging as the most important solution for refugee crises. The successful implementation of this repatriation would become a paradigm for other refugee situations in Africa (Harrell-Bond 1989, p. 55). The agency had supported the repatriation program and had much to lose if it failed.

### **Information Networks and Decision-Making**

The refugees who had left the Ogaden fled a region that had been devastated by war. In addition, the region had been subjected to a series of droughts and famines that had severely reduced the capacity of the land to maintain an agricultural or pastoral population. Many refugees feared reprisals if they were to return Ethiopia. The Ethiopian government had made it a crime to flee the country, even in time of war. The punishment if caught and convicted was a prison sentence of up to twenty years. In addition, forced land reform and the possible conscription of their children into the Ethiopian army were all of concern to the refugees (Phillips 1983, p. 6).

The refugees who were confined in isolated camps experienced some difficulties in obtaining accurate information about what conditions were like in home areas. Many of the camps had no mail or telephone service and the refugees were not permitted to leave their camps (Aitchison 1983, p. 48). Information about the *Dergue* regime in Ethiopia was frequently censored in both the Ethiopian and Djibouti press. Through their informal contacts, the refugees were aware that conditions in the Ogaden had not improved significantly, despite official assurances to the contrary from both the governments of Djibouti and Ethiopia. Indeed, refugees from the Ogaden continued to arrive in Djibouti bringing with them fresh information about the conflict zone.

While accurate news sources were suppressed, the government of Djibouti began a systematic campaign to persuade the refugees to return home (Phillips 1983, p.

5). Following the establishment of the Tripartite commission, stories began to appear in the local press that the refugees would be forced to return home. At one point, both governments announced in government-controlled Djibouti newspapers that the repatriation exercise would begin in only fifteen days and that refugees were to report immediately for registration (Crisp 1984b, p. 79). At the same time in Djibouti city, anti-Ethiopian sentiments were stirred up using the local media.

While the UNHCR publicly criticized the use of misinformation to frighten the refugees into returning home, it did not actively seek to inform or communicate with the refugees. Nor did UNHCR actively monitor the human rights situation of the refugees in Djibouti (Aitchison 1983, p. 51). By the middle of 1983, UNHCR had invested too much time and prestige in the Djibouti repatriation to consider postponing it. The prevailing food and security situation in the Ogaden was sufficiently unstable that most refugees decided to remain in exile. The aura of secrecy that surrounded repatriation negotiations, coupled with the governments' misinformation campaign, only made the refugees more skeptical of the program's real intentions.

### **Repatriation**

In the initial stage of the Ogaden refugee migration, there were several instances of refugees being forcibly returned to Ethiopia from Djibouti. While this was happening, few refugees considered registering for repatriation or returning home independently. However by mid-1983, some limited repatriation to Ethiopia had started. By the end of 1983, up to 7,000 refugees had left their camps inside Djibouti and returned to their homes in the Ogaden in a UNHCR sponsored repatriation exercise. By this time some of the more outrageous abuses of the refugees had ended and some refugees had been taken on inspection tours of their home areas to determine the state of conditions there (Crisp 1984b, p. 81).

While conditions at home in the Ogaden might have slightly improved, it is clear that the program of harassment of the refugees by the Djibouti authorities had taken its toll. "...the refugees were aware that their future in Djibouti was at best a limited one. After four years of intermittent harassment and intimidation, the refugees' morale was low, and the advantages of remaining in Djibouti were difficult to perceive." (Crisp 1984b, p. 81). While the repatriation was touted by governments and UNHCR alike as being voluntary, serious questions remain about the facts surrounding the case (Harrell-Bond 1987a, p. 9). Clearly the refugees were not provided with adequate relief supplies in Djibouti and were made to feel extremely unwelcome by the government.

### **Examination of Contexts**

The *social context* of Ogaden refugees in Djibouti was tightly controlled. The refugees were routinely confined in camps with poor services and no accurate official or independent information about conditions at home. The UNHCR and NGOs were discouraged from providing assistance to the refugees. The Government of Djibouti provided little in the way of direct support, so many refugees were forced to work in the informal sector, where they were subject to harassment or arrest. The refugees' *external context* was also tightly controlled. Both governments and the UNHCR had something riding on the repatriation exercise. The government of Ethiopia wanted to bring a potential resistance front under control and prove to the world that conditions were improving at home. The government of Djibouti wanted to be rid of an expensive and potentially explosive population within its borders. The UNHCR had invested money and significant prestige in the repatriation solution. Because both contexts were significantly controlled, this return migration can be classified as *imposed repatriation*.

While it is not discussed in detail here, in the mid-1980s, another large-scale return migration from Djibouti was widely criticized as being less than voluntary. There




were a number of incidents where refugees were herded onto freight-trains and returned to Ethiopia; some refugees were suffocated during the long journey (Frelick 1987). While only a fraction of the Ogaden refugee population returned home in 1983, the case was to have a widespread effect. The repatriation was widely reported in the literature on African refugees and sparked an academic interest in the modalities of refugee repatriation and especially the issue of voluntariness.

### **THE 1989 NAMIBIAN REPATRIATION**

The roots of the Namibian refugee crisis lie as far back as the end of the First World War. At the end of the conflict, the League of Nations was charged with the disposition of former German colonies. The region that was then known as South West Africa was mandated to South Africa, which was eager to exploit the large diamond reserves along the west coast of the region. While in 1970 the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) declared that the continued South African occupation of Namibia was illegal (UNSC Resolution 453), South Africa applied its *apartheid* policies to its northern colony (Cliffe 1994, p. 16). These policies included depriving the majority black population of the right to vote, controlling settlement patterns by creating eleven black 'homelands' and restricting access to a variety of government services. In the early 1960s, liberation fronts began to oppose the white domination of Namibia; this opposition was led by the South-West African Peoples' Organization (SWAPO) and its military wing the People's Liberation Army of Namibia (PLAN). In order to counteract the rise of resistance movements, the South African government retaliated ruthlessly against the Namibian population and resistance bases in the so-called 'Front-line States' that bordered South Africa and Namibia (Baloro 1992, p. 2).

Starting in the early 1970s, Namibians who were associated with SWAPO and to a lesser extent other liberation fronts were forced to flee their homes. Most of the refugees settled initially in southern Angola and Zambia (IDAF 1989, p. 84). After

**Figure 5.2 Namibia and Angola 1989**



Sources: UNHCR 1986, p. 4; Simon and Preston 1993, p. 52; US Committee for Refugees 1987, p. 45

1977, SWAPO provisional headquarters in the Angolan capital of Luanda carried much of the burden of receiving and maintaining Namibian refugees (Mwase 1990b, p. 114). While a few refugees periodically returned to Namibia and others continued to flee when they felt insecure, by 1980 the number of refugees in Angola and Zambia had stabilized at about 36,000 and 5,500 respectively (World Refugee Survey 1981, p. 12). The majority of these refugees were settled in rural areas in the Angolan provinces of Malange and Kwanza Sul, where they were became farmers and sometimes PLAN soldiers. A second set of refugees had moved on from their first country of exile and had settled elsewhere in Africa and throughout the world. While the number of refugees that were living outside Angola and Zambia is more difficult to determine, SWAPO estimated that a total of 80,000 Namibians were displaced, of which approximately one-half were living in Angola and Zambia (Gasarasi 1990, p. 357). The remaining 40,000 Namibians were living in forty-four other countries throughout the world (Baloro 1992, p. 29).

### **Social Context**

Wherever they went in the world, most Namibian exiles were associated with SWAPO, whose strong political organization provided a uniting link with their homeland (Mwase 1988, p. 22). Still, the two distinct populations of Namibian refugees, those living in Angola or Zambia and those living elsewhere, had very different *social contexts*. For many of those refugees settled near the Namibian frontier in agricultural settlements, they lived in similar conditions to those they had experienced at home. Namibian exile communities, especially those in the Front-line States were well-organized, cohesive units whose primary goal remained the overthrow of South African domination of Namibia (Mwase 1990b, p. 117).

Namibian refugees settled in southern Angola maintained strong kinship ties with each other. Sometimes entire communities had left Namibia at once and were re-

constituted in exile. Many refugees remained directly involved in the resistance movement as PLAN fighters. But because of the proximity of the refugee communities to Namibia, soldiers were periodically able to return home to their families.

Refugees in the Front-line states were provided some assistance by UNHCR. The distribution of this assistance was usually administered by SWAPO (World Refugee Survey 1988, p. 38). The assistance included housing grants and support for agricultural settlement. Since their establishment, SWAPO and PLAN both maintained a highly visible presence in the Namibian refugee camps. Because of this presence, the refugee settlements were the frequent targets of military attacks from the South African military forces (Mtango 1989, p. 93). The targeting of refugee communities by South Africa did have a certain de-stabilizing effect. For example, during attacks against SWAPO controlled refugee camps in Angola in 1978, seven-hundred refugees were killed and a further three-hundred were captured and returned to Namibia as prisoners (IDAF 1989, p. 62). However, security problems in exile never reached the level that many exiles considered returning to Namibia as a realistic option.

Other refugees had moved on from their initial settlement in the Front-line States. Some had settled elsewhere in Africa, while many others moved to eastern Europe or Cuba, because at the time SWAPO was receiving substantial political and material support from socialist and communist nations. These exiles frequently underwent additional education and training. Many of these refugees had left Namibia over thirty years before and had settled more-or-less permanently in third countries (Simon and Preston 1993, p. 54). Some of these refugees did not expect to return to Namibia, even following the success of the liberation struggle.

### **External Context**

The lengthy conflict in Namibia involved actors from many countries on several continents. While the liberation struggle primarily involved SWAPO and South Africa,

other nations such as Angola and Zambia were directly involved, while the United States the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and Cuba were peripherally involved (Cliffe *et al.* 1994, p. 63). While a complete survey of the strategic and political causes and effects of the thirty-year Namibian conflict is beyond the scope of this thesis, the manner in which the refugees were affected by political events is important. Since the early 1970s, PLAN soldiers, had maintained a low-intensity civil war in Namibia, particularly along the Angolan frontier and in the Caprivi strip. The conflict intensified in the mid 1970s following the Portuguese withdrawal from Angola and again in the early 1980s, following the breakdown of talks between SWAPO and the South African government in 1981. However by 1988 the military situation had reached a stalemate and the South African government, weary of the military losses it was sustaining in the conflict agreed to implement the conditions of UNSC Resolution 435 (Cliffe *et al.* 1994, p. 57).

Among other issues, UNSC Resolution 435 specifically addressed the issue of refugee repatriation to a newly independent Namibia. Two sections of the resolution dealt with voluntary repatriation; Paragraph 7(c) provided for repatriation in advance of elections:

“All Namibian refugees or Namibians detained or otherwise outside the territory of Namibia will be permitted to return peacefully and participate fully and freely in the electoral process without risk of arrest, detention, intimidation or imprisonment.”

Paragraph 7(d) guaranteed that the repatriation would be voluntary:

“The Special Representative of the Secretary-General with the assistance of the United Nations High Commission for Refugees and other appropriate international bodies will ensure that Namibians remaining outside of Namibia are given a free and voluntary choice whether to return. Provision will be made to attest to the voluntary nature of the decisions of Namibians who elect not to return to Namibia.”

In order for Namibian refugees to be able to return home without fear of persecution, it was first necessary for the colonial government to enact an amnesty for returnees, this occurred on June 6 1989 (Baloro 1992, p. 27). In addition it was necessary for the

government to repeal all discriminatory legislation. This complex process involved the alteration or elimination of some sixty laws and was not completed in time for the proposed start of the repatriation exercise (Gasarasi 1990, p. 343). By the start of the organized return however, sufficient progress in legislative reform had been made to convince most refugees that the process would continue.

In order to facilitate repatriation, Zambia and Angola respectively, entered into tripartite agreements with UNHCR and SWAPO. These agreements set out the plan for the registration, transport reception and resettlement of returning refugees. Difficulties were encountered with the colonial government of Namibia, which was hostile to the potential returnees, who were mostly SWAPO members or sympathizers. Initially, the government refused to accept UNHCR documents as legal identification. In addition, refugees were to be rigorously medically screened and have their fingerprints taken (Gasarasi 1990, p. 344). Careful negotiations with the government removed most of these administrative roadblocks, but the colonial administrators remained openly hostile to the returnees.

### **Information Networks and Decision-Making**

For almost all Namibian refugees, their connection with SWAPO provided them with information about conditions in the homeland. Unlike many contemporary refugees who may be considering a return to their homelands, Namibian refugees were united in their resolution to remain in exile until there was fundamental political change in their homeland (Stein, Cuny and Reed 1995, p. 9). In this case, the information provided during exile had little to do with the possibilities of immediate repatriation. The primary role for SWAPO was to keep the refugees informed about the ongoing liberation struggle and maintain morale, particularly in the close-knit refugee camps. Because of the relative lack of restrictions placed on them, Namibian churches also played a role in the refugee information network. The Council of Churches in Namibia

played an important role in informing refugees before and during the repatriation exercise (Cliffe *et al.* 1994, p. 32). For refugees living outside the Front-line States, the world press was an essential source about the progress of liberation struggle and subsequent liberation negotiations.

Following the successful negotiations with the South African Government, SWAPO and UNHCR started a campaign to inform refugees about the prospects for repatriation. At this time it was unclear how many Namibians were actually displaced and how many of them were likely to want to return home. While SWAPO claimed that there were 90,000 Namibians in exile (Simon and Preston 1993, p. 55), this figure was probably exaggerated in order to inflate SWAPO's international standing. As it was, only about 46,000 refugees ever returned to Namibia.

Refugees were informed by the UNHCR about the timing and technicalities of the forthcoming repatriation exercise. Before any large-scale repatriation was started, visits to Namibia by refugee committees from Angola and Zambia were organized (Gasarasi 1990, p. 344). They were permitted access to potential returnee transit centres, towns and rural areas in order to confirm that the country was secure and that preparations were in order for the repatriation. These representatives then reported back to their comrades in exile. In order to ensure the voluntariness of the repatriation, refugees were required to sign a declaration that they were returning voluntarily to Namibia (Simon and Preston 1993, p. 52). Refugees were informed that those who had settled permanently and granted citizenship in other nations would not be forced to return to Namibia.

Because some of the refugees had lived in exile for up to three decades, the decision to return to Namibia was not always a straightforward one. Refugees, particularly those who had settled outside the Front-line States had created social and economic ties with their new countries (Simon and Preston 1993, p. 53). Some refugees who had pursued educational or vocational upgrading were unsure of their job

prospects in the new Namibia. While many refugees were aware that following the departure of some whites to South Africa there would be some increased employment opportunities, they were also aware that their status as exiles and their affiliation with SWAPO might count against them in their search for jobs in an economy controlled by whites (Morna 1990, p. 61). Another problem concerned the ex-PLAN soldiers, almost all of whom planned to return to Namibia. Many of the ex-combatants had little training outside their military experience (Mwase 1990b, p. 119). While a small percentage of these returnees were hoping to integrate into the new Namibian Army, the majority of the soldiers were expected to find employment independently.

### **Repatriation**

The Namibian repatriation exercise began in mid-June 1989. In consideration of UNSC Resolution 435, the repatriation had to be completed in advance of national elections scheduled for late 1989. To facilitate the repatriation, all returnees arrived by air to one of only three entry points. From there, the refugees moved on to one of five reception centres where they remained for up to one week. In these reception centres, the returnees were fed, medically screened, immunized and their relatives were traced if necessary (Simon and Preston 1993, p. 53). The majority of the refugees had returned by the end of September. The repatriation exercise itself went off with few problems, despite the fact that the colonial government, that was still in power, was openly hostile to many of the returnees and their affiliation with SWAPO (Gasarasi 1990, p. 346).

While the actual return and reception program was successful, for many returnees the next two years were very difficult. Unemployment among returnees after one year held at fifty-seven percent, while after two years only thirty percent of returnees had obtained full-time employment. A further forty-six percent were engaged in casual employment or small-holder agriculture (Preston 1994, p. 264). The reason for the lack of opportunities for returnees was two-fold. The UNHCR had viewed



repatriation as a solely technical exercise, not as a socio-economic transition period for the returnees. For example, it was assumed by UNHCR that returnees would be accommodated by their families upon arrival in Namibia (Tapscott and Mulongeni 1990, p. 5). No plans were made to assist returnees' integration into the Namibian economy, or provide development projects. This occurred in part because of a second constraint; while SWAPO controlled the government land base of Namibia, it did not control or have significant input into the economic base of Namibia, that was still controlled by white Namibians and South Africans. In addition, in its transition from a liberation front to a political party and government, SWAPO had to be careful not to favour returnees over others for economic development (Tapscott 1994, p. 258).

### **Examination of Contexts**

The *social contexts* of the two distinct varieties of Namibian refugees were very different. While the exiles in the Front-line states lived in close contact with SWAPO and their refugee neighbours and were occasionally subjected to attacks from South African or Angolan forces, they were resolute in their desire not to return to an occupied Namibia. Refugees living elsewhere had fewer constraints on their *social contexts*. As long as they were able to find legal asylum and employment, they were free to live as refugees. It would be accurate to represent the *social contexts* of both groups as being free.

As to the *external context*, there is room for some debate. While the refugees had signed a declaration that they had been given a free choice to return, for the refugees in the Front-line states the consequences of not returning were not spelled out. The continuing civil war in Angola could have played a role in deciding the fate of refugees settled in that country. As it was, the great majority of the refugees who settled in Angola and Zambia did return home. The fact that some of the refugees settled elsewhere in the world did not return home, provides a good indication that they were

allowed a free choice to remain in exile. Because of these factors, the Namibian repatriation experience can be classified as a *voluntary repatriation*.


### **THE 1993-94 SOMALI REPATRIATIONS FROM KENYA**

The precursors for the conflict that has gripped the nation of Somalia since the start of the 1990s are found in the country's north in 1982 (Barcik and Normark 1991, p. 13). At this time, periodic clashes erupted between the insurgent Somali National Movement (SNM) and the autocratic regime of Siad Barre. By 1988 the clashes with the SNM and other military fronts had developed into a full-scale civil war (Africa Watch and Physicians for Human Rights 1992, p. 3). While SNM and other armed movements were able to gain control of significant portions of the country, a large number of Somalis were forced to flee to Ethiopia and Djibouti.

As the military campaigns continued throughout 1991, all sides maintained a 'scorched earth' policy that devastated the Somali infrastructure, while causing increased internal and external refugee migrations (Rogge 1994, p. 65). As the Somali conflict progressed, it further degenerated into intense rivalries between the clans and sub-clans that were represented by the major factions (Ryle 1992b, p. 7). The complete degeneration of the conflict into inter-clan warfare severely reduced the ability of international agencies to broker a sustained peace (Gallagher and Martin 1992, p. 6). During 1992 and 1993 the conflict completely engulfed the southern half of the country. In addition to the civil war, repeated droughts in the late 1980s and early 1990s severely reduced the capacity of Somalis to provide enough food for themselves (Unruh 1993, p. 54). In 1993 no part of the country remained untouched by the conflict, that by then had killed tens of thousands of people and laid-waste to Somalia's formal economy and infrastructure.

The situation of displaced persons in Somalia was as complicated as the civil war itself. While estimates vary, there is consensus that at the height of the conflict, up

**Figure 5.3 Kenya and Somalia 1994**



Sources: UNHCR 1993g, p. 5; Editions Jeune Afrique 1973, p. 230

to 400,000 Somalis were internally displaced (IOM 1994, p. 2). An even greater number were forced to leave Somalia; in 1991 up to 400,000 refugees had fled to Ethiopia in addition to 100,000 to Djibouti. The peak refugee migration to Kenya occurred in mid-1993, when about 400,000 Somalis settled inside the frontier (Rogge 1994, p. 67). Here the refugees lived in a series of squalid camps and were provided with only the most basic relief assistance.

### **Social Context**

Two key issues affected the *social context* of Somali refugees in Kenya, first the complex relationship between Kenya, Somalia and ethnic Somalis living in Kenya. Second, Kenya's historically poor attitude towards all refugees. Kenya and Somalia have a long and varied history of conflict and cooperation. A useful starting point is the period just before Kenya gained its independence from Great Britain in 1963. Because the population of colonial Kenya included a significant number of ethnic Somalis, an attempt was made to determine if they wanted to be part of the new Kenyan state or that of Somalia. While an international commission determined that the majority of ancestral Somalis preferred re-unification with the Somali nation, the British government sought to placate the soon-to-be president of Kenya, Jomo Kenyatta (African Rights 1993, p. 9). The emerging government of Kenya did not want to lose up to twenty-five percent of its territory, despite the fact that it was a semi-arid region populated by ethnic Somalis. In the end, the British did not turn over the territory to Somalia.

Since independence and particularly during the Siad Barre regime, Kenya has generally supported the central government in Mogadishu, while at the same time it has made ethnic Somalis in Kenya second-class citizens in their own country (African Rights 1993, p. 8). In the area near the frontier between Somalia and Kenya, frequent

raids by Somali bandits or *shifita* exacerbated tensions between the Kenyan Government and ethnic Somalis. The entire frontier area with Somalia was under a state of emergency that lasted until 1991. Because of these tensions, ethnic Somalis throughout Kenya have been subjected to periodic harassment, arrest and even deportation from the country, particularly in the late 1980s and 1990s.

Unlike neighbouring states, Kenya had been fortunate in not becoming host to large refugee populations in the 1970s and 1980s. By 1990 Kenya was host to only a small refugee population of about 15,000, a mere fraction of the number in neighbouring states such as Sudan and Ethiopia (UNHCR 1991b). However, what few refugees did find their way to Kenya were generally not well treated by the Government. The procedure for establishing refugee status in Kenya was lengthy and complicated. Most refugees living in Kenya were classified simply as 'asylum seekers', who had little legal protection. The Kenyan Government frequently used refugees as scapegoats for national problems and had forcibly repatriated refugees on several occasions (World Refugee Survey 1991, p. 44).

The arrival of large numbers of Somali refugees fleeing the anarchy in that country brought together Kenya's traditional hostility to refugees and ethnic Somalis. From the outset, the Kenyan government made little effort to provide assistance to Somali refugees, who they settled in isolated border camps. By 1993, Somali refugees in Kenya were settled in three distinct areas. Some early refugees had arrived at the port of Mombassa and were housed in camps outside the city. Along the south-east frontier with Somalia was a cluster of camps that held the majority of the refugees. Further north, near the Ethiopia-Somalia frontier was a third set of refugee camps, some of which contained Ethiopian refugees as well (Gallagher and Martin 1992, p. 16). Most of the refugee camps in Kenya provided no opportunity for refugees to become self-supporting. The border area between Kenya and Somalia is in the semi-arid zone and is not capable of supporting large concentrations of people. Large amounts of

development assistance would have been necessary to provide the refugees with the opportunity of becoming self-sufficient.

The refugees in the camps were initially maintained on limited rations provided by NGOs. During the start of the refugee migration from Somalia, UNHCR had little presence in Kenya, as the country had no recent history of large-scale refugee migrations. From the outset, NGOs such as CARE Kenya took on much of the burden, providing food, medical care and sanitation facilities to the refugees (Gallagher and Martin 1992, p. 18). Because of their confinement in isolated camps, the refugees were afforded little opportunity to participate in the Kenyan economy, further restricting the refugees' *social contexts*.

The one element of the refugees' *social context* that was a major concern from the outset was security. The catalogue of mistreatment against Somali refugees in Kenya is well documented. Two kinds of abuse against Somali refugees in Kenya have been identified. The first was attacks by *shifita* bandits. The second was attacks against the refugees by the Kenyan security forces themselves (Africa Rights 1993, p. 12). The settlement of refugees so close to the Somali frontier made them extremely vulnerable to attack from within Somalia. In addition because the refugees were isolated from central Kenya, when they were attacked or victimized by local people, these abuses were frequently not acknowledged by those in charge of the Kenyan police or military. On the contrary, Somali refugees were repeatedly harassed by Kenyan police who frequently beat and robbed them (Waldron and Hasci 1995, p. 14).

One of the worst problems documented was the attack and rape of girls and women in the numerous refugee settlements near the Somali frontier. On many occasions, the camps were infiltrated by roaming bandits, some Somali, some Kenyan. Refugee women were frequently attacked for money, food and sex. In several instances, the attackers were reported to be members of the Kenyan police (Nowrojee 1993, p. 44). While NGOs and UNHCR set up programs to counteract the effects of these

attacks (UNHCR 1993g, p. 4), little action was taken by the Kenyan Government to stop these attacks.

It has been suggested that the Kenyan government did not attempt to end the harassment of Somali refugees by the *shifita* or the security forces so that the security situation would deteriorate sufficiently to impel the refugees into a return migration (African Rights 1993, p. 47). It is clear that the government was never interested in finding or prosecuting anyone accused of participating in crimes against the refugees (Nowrojee 1993, p. 45). In addition, while UNHCR was fully aware of the outrages being committed in the frontier regions, it did little to pursue the matter of refugee protection directly with the Kenyan government or in the Kenyan courts. Because of the extremely anti-Somali attitude of the Kenyan Government and the abuses of refugee rights associated with this attitude, the *social context* of Somali refugees in Kenya can be easily described as ‘controlled’.

### **External Context**

In this case the *external* context of the refugees was rather limited. Because of the disintegration of law and order in Somalia itself, there was no national authority available to affect the refugees’ decision-making processes. In this case, it was NGOs and UNHCR, with their cross-border operations that controlled the *external context*. In order to facilitate the delivery of aid and relief assistance, starting in mid-1992, the UN decided to access south-western Somalia through Kenya. The stated goal of this cross-border operation was to provide flexible assistance to the internally displaced and returnees in Somalia (UNHCR 1993g, p. 10). The program did have an effect on Somali refugees in Kenya, when some refugees started to leave their camps. Already threatened by the deteriorating conditions in Kenyan camps, the placement of relief aid inside the Somali frontier could be perceived as an attempt to entice refugees away

from Kenya. Still despite the cross-border operation, for the most part, the refugees *external contexts* remained 'free'.

### **Information and Decision-Making**

There is little detailed information about how Somali refugees in Kenya received information about conditions at home. Because the refugees were settled in poorly serviced and isolated border camps, it can be assumed that little official media coverage about Somalia found its way directly to the refugees. The most likely source of information for refugees were the hundreds of new arrivals in the camps each week. These new refugees would be able to report to other refugees that conditions in Somalia were not improving and in some cases, were actually deteriorating. There was also less chance that the Somali refugees would receive information from early returnees. Unlike many other refugee situations, where refugees return home periodically; because of the great distances involved, refugees in Kenya did not have the opportunity to move freely back and forth across the frontier. In order to discourage return refugee migration, those refugees that did return home were frequently provided only enough supplies to last them for their journey (Waldron and Hasci 1995, p. 68). After their long walk home, the refugees were unlikely to return immediately to Kenya in order to provide information about home conditions. Throughout 1992 and 1993, most Somali refugees decided that remaining in Kenya, despite the appalling conditions there, was a better option than returning home. Those refugees that did return home at that time were often not provided with a truly free choice of remaining in exile.

### **Repatriation and Examination of Contexts**

The repatriation of Somali refugees in 1993 and 1994 did not occur in a single mass movement. As conditions in individual camps changed and as refugees heard limited news of the security situation in Somalia, some refugees decided that conditions



in Kenya were at least as bad as conditions at home. After the establishment of the cross-border program in 1992, refugees slowly began to return to Somalia. During the first half of 1993, 32,000 refugees had returned to Somalia (UNHCR 1994a, p. 2).

Following pressure from international donors, the Kenyan government allowed NGOs and UNHCR greater access to Somali refugees and conditions in Kenyan camps improved in early 1992. However, after the national election in Kenya in mid-1992, the re-elected Government of Daniel arap Moi began to stress that immediate repatriation was the only solution to the problems of banditry in frontier areas. At that time, some UNHCR officials doubted that the security situation in Somalia had improved sufficiently to warrant a large-scale repatriation program. They accused the government of using the spectre of forced repatriation to blackmail the international community into taking an even greater burden in caring for the refugees (African Rights 1993, p. 46). These incidents coincided with the start of the American led 'Operation Restore Hope' that was intended to restore peace and democracy to Somalia. This only increased calls by the Kenyan government to begin a repatriation program.

Subsequent to the events of 1992, more refugees began to leave camps in Kenya. The following is an example of the kind of 'voluntary' repatriation that occurred to Somalia from Kenya in 1993 and 1994: Near the Ethiopian and Somali borders was the Mandera refugee camp, that was established in early 1992 to cope with the sudden influx of 30,000 refugees in a matter of weeks. Rather than provide comprehensive health and food assistance, UNHCR decided that a fully-serviced refugee camp would only attract locals seeking to take advantage of free goods and services. The UNHCR decided that a minimalist approach would be the best, so the refugees were provided with only the most basic relief assistance (Gallagher and Martin 1992, p. 23). The hope was that refugees would respond to the lack of services in Mandera camp and would return home swiftly. This they did, as reported in UNHCR's


*Information Bulletin* (1994a, p. 2); Mandera camp was closed by early 1994 because all the refugees returned to Somalia ‘voluntarily’.

By the end of 1994 up to 170,000 refugees had left Kenya. While UNHCR described these returns as voluntary (UNHCR 1994a, p. 2), there is serious doubt that the refugees were adequately protected by the Kenyan government while in the country. The manner in which the refugees *social contexts* were controlled by the limited assistance they received, the harassment and violence they experienced and the generally hostile reception given to them by the Kenyan government leads this repatriation to be classified as an *expulsion*.

### **1994 REPATRIATION TO MOZAMBIQUE**

Like many other conflicts in Africa, the roots of the Mozambican civil war can be traced back to the colonial era. Mozambique had been a Portuguese colony since the late 1800s and there appeared to be little chance of Portugal giving independence to its colony. However, due to sudden political changes in Portugal in 1974, a new government decided to divest itself of most of its colonial possessions. Almost as soon as Mozambique became independent in 1975, the country was engaged in its own civil war. Starting in 1976, rebels known from the *Resistência Nacional Moçambicana* (RENAMO) attempted to gain control of the state. The history of RENAMO’s long and brutal insurgency is rooted in the policies of white-controlled Rhodesia and South Africa. After Mozambican independence, white Rhodesians became wary of the increasing numbers of governments controlled by black Africans in the region. The Rhodesian Government, in an attempt to de-stabilize the new Marxist state of Mozambique, trained, funded and equipped rebel RENAMO forces (Huffman 1992, p. 115). Following the transformation of white-controlled Rhodesia into black-controlled Zimbabwe in 1980, RENAMO was supported by the Government of South Africa.

**Figure 5.4 Mozambique 1994**



Sources: UNHCR 1992, pp. 100, 110, 175, 207; Editions Jeune Afrique 1973, p. 231

RENAMO also received additional assistance from former Portuguese residents of Mozambique, who were settled in South Africa (Meldrum 1992, p. 30).

At the same time, the Mozambican government, fueled by Marxist ideology began a campaign of economic reforms and population displacements that alienated many people in the country. Mozambicans felt particularly threatened by the Government's policy of forcible relocation into 'communal villages', that were supposed to increase agricultural output (Drumtra 1994, p. 1). RENAMO was able to capitalize on the concerns of a few Mozambicans and with continued support from South Africa, was able to gain control of many of the country's rural areas. Once RENAMO had conquered a region, they were very effective at exploiting the local inhabitants for food and other resources.

The war that RENAMO waged was especially destructive. Following a RENAMO attack, whatever could not be removed as plunder was destroyed. Schools, hospitals, government buildings, even roads and electricity lines were destroyed. It is estimated that up to 1 million Mozambicans were killed during the war (Meldrum 1992, p. 29). The violence of the civil war also displaced a large proportion of the Mozambican population. By 1992 nearly two million Mozambicans had fled their homes and had settled as refugees. Malawi bore the brunt of the refugee migration, while Zimbabwe and South Africa also received substantial numbers of refugees. In 1992 1,070,000 Mozambicans were settled in Malawi, while Zimbabwe and South Africa each had about 250,000 refugees (World Refugee Survey 1993, p. 50).

### **Social Context**

The majority of Mozambique's refugees settled in Malawi, which is one of the poorest and least developed countries in Africa. The refugees were settled evenly between refugee camps and small agricultural plots provided to them by local leaders (World Refugee Survey 1993, p. 66). For most refugees in Malawi life was difficult,

while some refugees were able to produce some food of their own, the majority received additional assistance in the form of food aid. Refugees in Malawi were provided with some degree of freedom. They were not confined to camps and were generally permitted to travel in the country and return periodically to Mozambique.

Refugees in Tanzania were also allowed considerable freedom and received only limited assistance from the government or NGOs. The situation was quite different for refugees in Zimbabwe. While only receiving a quarter of the number of refugees that neighbouring Malawi did, the Government of Zimbabwe decided to confine the refugees to camps. The services provided to the refugees were generally very good, for example, the school system that developed was in many ways superior to that in Mozambique (De Wolf 1994, p. 2). Still, many Zimbabwean camps were surrounded by fences and barbed wire, ostensibly for the refugees' own protection (World Refugee Survey 1993, p. 77). The Government occasionally closed camps and limited refugee arrivals when conditions in the camps grew unstable. This occurred primarily during 1992, when southern Africa was hit by a devastating drought that destroyed crops, dried wells and greatly increased mortality rates in some refugee camps.

The majority of Mozambican refugees in Malawi and elsewhere were settled with their immediate families. One survey conducted in Zimbabwe found that seventy percent of the camp residents lived with their nuclear family (Makanya 1992, p. 15). For the most part, the proximity of many family members allowed for the continuation of kin relationships similar to those encountered previously in Mozambique. Some families dispersed members throughout Zimbabwe or Malawi in order to maximize employment opportunities (De Wolf 1994, p. 1). Refugees who had been in exile the longest, sometimes over ten years, had frequently built huts of their own, as well as accumulating clothing and furnishings. More importantly, many long-stay refugees were able to establish wide-reaching social networks that enabled them to find employment and seek out other economic opportunities (Wilson 1993, p. 11). On the

other hand, newly arrived refugees generally had few possessions and social contacts during their initial period in exile.

As noted previously, in 1992 drought severely affected refugees in Malawi and Zimbabwe. The drought also affected parts of Mozambique and many more refugees fled the country because of food shortages (Drumtra 1994, p. 17). Conditions in some camps in Zimbabwe deteriorated badly and malnutrition among children was widespread. Still the drought and its effects did not provoke significant return migration to Mozambique. Many refugees were well aware of RENAMO's continuing war of terror at home. As is described in more detail below, most refugees, particularly those in Malawi had access to reliable and current information about conditions at home (Makanya 1993, p. 3).

Security in exile was also of concern to some refugees especially in Malawi and South Africa. While for many years Malawi was a genuine safe-haven for refugees, starting in the 1990s banditry and attacks on refugees became more common (Drumtra 1994, p. 15). As Malawi's internal political situation became less predictable and as the drought became more severe, refugees increasingly became the target of scape-goating by Malawis. There were also occasional incursions by RENAMO into Malawi and harassment of refugees by Malawi officials (Nunes and Wilson 1991, p. 37). Because the country is small and was densely packed with refugees, many refugees settled in frontier areas and could not be relocated further away. Refugees from Malawi who found their way to South Africa had to face even greater insecurity. The South African regime considered all refugees from Mozambique to be illegal aliens. If caught they were usually subjected to immediate *refoulement* back to Mozambique. While accurate numbers are difficult to determine, it is assumed that up to 300,000 Mozambicans were living illegally in South Africa in the early 1990s (Drumtra 1994, p. 16).

Despite some of the constraints placed on Mozambican refugees during their exile, in three major asylum states at least, there was some freedom. Refugees were

provided relief and development assistance and were generally able to associate freely with each other. In many cases the refugees were permitted access to the formal and informal job market to earn cash. While there were instances of forced repatriation, specifically from South Africa and Zimbabwe, most refugees were allowed to remain in exile as long as they wanted.

### **External Context**

The long conflict between RENAMO and the Mozambican government officially ended in Rome on October 4th, 1992. The settlement did not occur until there had been twelve rounds of peace negotiations over several years (Hill 1993, p. 44). Two significant events had brought the two sides to the negotiating table. Starting in 1986, after the death of President Samora Machel, the new Mozambican Government headed by Joaquim Chissano, began to move away from its Marxist ideology and towards a market economy (McCormick 1993, p. 224). While RENAMO's exact political program had always been slightly obscure, it had always maintained an anti-Marxist front. At the same time, the drought that was gripping southern Africa began to affect RENAMO's operational capacity. Because it was very dependent on the agricultural inputs that it appropriated from its conquered territory, the drought and the subsequent shortages it produced had a detrimental effect on RENAMO.

There were two major *external* concerns for potential Mozambican returnees, both had to do with security. The first of these was land tenure security. Because millions of Mozambicans had been displaced, both inside and outside the country, the state's land tenure system was in a state of flux. Many internally displaced people settled wherever they could find arable land in a safe area. In addition, the Mozambican Government's previous policy of settling people in organized villages further complicated the situation. Many refugees were uncertain how the land they had worked previously would be allocated after a peace settlement (Lawyers' Committee for

Human Rights 1994, p. 15). In addition, following the peace agreement, the Mozambican government entered into a series of secret deals with private companies that intended to start commercial farms on vast tracts of the best land (Drumtra 1994, p. 29). Refugees hearing rumours of the land deals felt increasingly insecure remaining in exile.

The other type of security in the *external context* was the physical security of potential returnees. In some areas of the country, such as in Tete province, the military presence of RENAMO receded rapidly following the conclusion of the peace accord. Elsewhere however, such as around the port of Beira, reports of RENAMO banditry continued for some time afterwards (Hill 1993, p. 46). The peace accords signed in Rome included the deployment of UN peace-keeping forces to help ensure security in Mozambique. But perhaps the biggest security problem was that of land-mines. As noted in Chapter Four, mines are one of the most insidious problems following many conflicts. It has been variously estimated that up to two-million mines were planted in Mozambique since the late 1960s (Meldrum 1994, p. 48). While UNHCR repatriation plans included land-mine clearance programs, many refugees began returning home before the programs commenced (Lawyers' Committee for Human Rights 1994, p. 14).

### **Information Networks and Decision-Making**

Depending upon where they were settled, refugees had different experiences with regard to obtaining information and making repatriation decisions. The refugees with the best access to accurate information about Mozambique were those living in Malawi. Because of their proximity to their homes and the relative lack of border restrictions, many refugee families were able to periodically return a member to Mozambique during a lull in the conflict. Because of these periodic repatriations, detailed information about conditions in Mozambique crossed back into Malawi (Wilson 1993, p. 11; Lawyers Committee for Human Rights 1994, p. 9). Immediately



following the peace agreement, up to 300,000 refugees returned home spontaneously, providing a base of returnees who were able to pass information back to Malawi (Drumtra 1994, p. 19). Some refugees who lived within a few days walk of home would return to investigate conditions there. If they appeared promising, they would return to Malawi and bring their families back to Mozambique.

The UNHCR plan for repatriation did not provide for the dissemination of information to refugees. There was no program to inform them of their right to remain in asylum if they felt insecure (Wilson 1993, p. 5). This was especially unfortunate for refugees in Zimbabwe. Unlike their counterparts in Malawi, refugees in Zimbabwe were not able to get access to good quality information. Because of the closed nature of the camps, very few refugee families were able to return a member to Mozambique in order to confirm conditions there (Makanya 1992, p. 18). The refugees also distrusted many official information sources (De Wolf 1994, p. 3). Some refugees thought that the talk about peace at home was misinformation intended to impel a return migration. While in some cases, NGOs undertook pilot programs to provide them with information, many refugees in Zimbabwe felt that they did not have sufficient resources to make good decisions (Drumtra 1994, p. 20). Of special concern were vulnerable groups, such as female heads of household. Members of these groups were sometimes left out of the information cycle, perhaps causing them to make inappropriate decisions (Makanya 1994, p. 13).

When making their decision whether to return, refugees had also to take their *social contexts* into account. Some refugees who had been in exile for years had built up social contacts, had more children and amassed numerous personal possessions. These refugees were less likely to leave in a rush, as they often had to make arrangements to transport their belongings home (Wilson 1993, p. 11). Other refugees who had arrived more recently, or lived only a day's walk from home could make a more rapid decision to return home (Meldrum 1994 p. 44). One other consideration in

the repatriation decision-making process was the amount of assistance provided to the refugees. While UN agencies and NGOs were starting the daunting task of restoring some of Mozambique's destroyed infrastructure, they were also providing some repatriation assistance. Refugees from Zimbabwe, who usually had a greater distance to travel were given transportation assistance, while those closer to home had UNHCR funded food and tool packages pre-positioned in home areas (Drumtra 1994, p. 25). Refugees had to determine if it was worth waiting for repatriation packages, or if their needs were better served by spontaneously repatriating.

### **Repatriation**

Following the peace accord, and in advance of a formal agreement on repatriation, refugees began returning to some parts of Mozambique. These returnees came from Malawi and generally had to travel only a short distance to get home. Some of these early returns alarmed UNHCR officials in Malawi. The period following the signing of the peace accord was an ambiguous time in the repatriation and rehabilitation process. While UNHCR was glad that the refugees were eager to return home, it wanted to avoid the sort of debacle that had occurred recently in Angola (Lawyers' Committee for Human Rights 1994, p. 10). In that case, refugees had returned after the peace agreement was signed, but before stability had returned to the country and before repatriation assistance could be provided to the refugees. When conflict erupted again, many new returnees were forced to flee a second time.

Original UNHCR plans assumed that the great majority of the refugees would return spontaneously to Mozambique. The assumption was correct, as up to ninety-five percent of the refugees received no specific repatriation assistance (Makanya 1994, p. 12). Most of the refugees were so eager to return home that they returned home well in advance of UNHCR's most optimistic repatriation schedule. The UNHCR received some criticism that it was ill-prepared for organizing the largest repatriation in African

history. Some of the facts would appear to support these criticisms. Eight months after the peace accord, only ten professional UNHCR officers were stationed in Mozambique. (Drumtra 1994, p, 31). In addition, from the outset UNHCR became caught-up in the logistical problems of the repatriation exercise and did not provide sufficient protection monitors during the early phases of repatriation, when they were most needed (Wilson 1993, p. 5).

By the end of 1994, up to 750,000 refugees had returned home to Mozambique. A further 1.5 million internally displaced people resettled themselves (World Refugee Survey 1995, p. 68). The newly resettled people placed strains on the international assistance program for Mozambique. Disappointing returns on international assistance appeals by UNHCR and NGOs meant that many returnees did not have access to clean drinking water or agricultural development programs. In addition, some of the expected land tenure problems came to pass as returnees were again forced to relocate.

### **Examination of Contexts**

Because the Mozambican repatriation was the largest in African history, it is difficult to classify it using a single type. Some refugees, such as those in South Africa in the early 1990s, were given absolutely no choice and were definitely *expelled* back to Mozambique. For the most part however, Mozambican refugees were given a free choice to remain in exile, but there are some questions as to whether all refugees were aware of their ability to make this choice independently. In addition, while the refugees, particularly those in Malawi, were provided with levels of assistance that were generous considering the poverty of their hosts, the drought that afflicted southern Africa had a detrimental effect on the provision of relief supplies, that may have forced some refugees to return home earlier than they would have liked. In Mozambique, many of the security concerns about RENAMO never came to pass. While the former armed front experienced some difficulty in adapting to its new role as a political party,

following the Mozambican elections there was little evidence that it was considering returning to an armed struggle. The combination of relatively free *social* and *external contexts* allows the majority Mozambican repatriation experience in 1994 to be called a *voluntary repatriation*.