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# ***The UN and the Resolution of Conflict in Mozambique***

by CHRIS ALDEN\*

THE signing of the General Peace Agreement in Rome in October 1992 marked the formal cessation of 17 years of intermittent warfare in the former Portuguese colony of Mozambique.<sup>1</sup> The bitter struggle by the guerrilla movement known as the *Resistência Nacional Moçambicana* (Renamo) to topple the avowedly Marxist–Leninist régime established by the leaders of the *Frente de Libertação de Moçambique* (Frelimo) was in many respects a regional expression of the cold war politics which dominated the international environment. The transformations in the Soviet Union and South Africa, blunting the ideological and logistical support which had fuelled the conflict, provoked a crisis for the protagonists. With over a million casualties, a greater number of refugees in neighbouring countries, and an economy devastated by war and mismanagement, the Government and Renamo at last sued for peace.<sup>2</sup>

The implementation of most of the key provisions of the peace agreement was placed in the hands of the United Nations, which was called upon to facilitate the process of demilitarisation and the movement to democracy. Burdened from the outset by considerable difficulties, ranging from a manifest reluctance to co-operate on the part of the Mozambican parties to bureaucratic mismanagement by the international community, the momentum of the peace process virtually ground to a halt in its first year. Nevertheless, in spite of significant delays and periodic crises, the UN was able to complete its mandate with the holding of the country's first democratic elections in October 1994.

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<sup>1</sup> For a review of the negotiations leading up to the signing of the General Peace Agreement, see Alex Vines, 'No Democracy Without Money: the road to peace in Mozambique, 1982–1992', in *Catholic Institute for International Relations (CIIR) Briefing Paper* (London), April 1994.

<sup>2</sup> See Chris Alden and Mark Simpson, 'Mozambique: a delicate peace', in *The Journal of Modern African Studies* (Cambridge), 31.1, March 1993, pp. 109–30.

## THE RÔLE OF THE UNITED NATIONS

The UN involvement in Mozambique grew directly out of the peace agreement that had been negotiated under the auspices of the Sant' Egidio Community, a Catholic charity organisation, between July 1991 and October 1992. Apart from establishing a timetable for the full demobilisation of both armies by April 1993, the agreement called upon the UN not only to provide humanitarian assistance but also to monitor the cease-fire as well as the ensuing elections.<sup>3</sup> In order to devise and finance adequate mechanisms for discharging such responsibilities, an assessment of the scope and magnitude of the UN rôle in the peace process was needed. Almost immediately, after receiving Boutros Boutros-Ghali's report on developments in Mozambique on 13 October 1992, the Security Council adopted Resolution 782 (1992) which authorised the Secretary-General to appoint a Special Representative and up to 25 military observers.

### 1. *From the UN Mandate to the Establishment of the UN Operation*

The acting Special Representative, Aldo Ajello, an Italian diplomat, and 21 military observers were sent to Mozambique on 15 October 1992. The situation which confronted them initially was to be replicated throughout the next two years. Despite the formal signing of a cease-fire and the pledge to establish a national commission to oversee the implementation of the peace agreement, the Government and Renamo had taken no action to realise these objectives. Furthermore, testifying to the continuing mistrust, a number of alleged cease-fire violations were already marring the co-operative atmosphere between the two sides so recently seen in Rome.

The Government and Renamo were persuaded by Ajello, in cooperation with the Western powers involved in the 1991-2 negotiations, to formally establish the *Comissão de Supervisão e Controle* (CSC) as the central authority overseeing the implementation of the peace agreement. Chaired by the Secretary-General's Special Representative, the Supervision and Control Commission was composed of representatives from the Government and Renamo, as well as Italy, Portugal, France, Britain, and the United States. Its mandate included settling disputes between the parties, interpreting what had been agreed in Rome, and co-ordinating the work of essential subsidiary bodies. Hence the

<sup>3</sup> For an outline of the timetable, see *General Peace Agreement of Mozambique, 1992* (Amsterdam, African-European Institute, 1992), Protocols 4-6.

creation by the CSC at its first meeting on 4 November 1992 of the Cease-Fire Commission, the Commission for the Reintegration of Demobilising Military Personnel, and the Joint Commission for the Formation of the Mozambican Defence Force. At the same time, Ajello and his team designed an operational plan which the Secretary-General presented to the Security Council on 3 December 1992. As explained then by Boutros-Ghali:

In the light of recent experiences elsewhere, the recommendations in this present report may be thought to invite the international community to take a risk. I believe that the risk is worth taking; but I cannot disguise that it exists.<sup>4</sup>

After a debate and the adoption of Resolution 797 (1992), the United Nations Operation in Mozambique (Onumoz) was officially launched.

The whole UN operation, including provisions for 7,500 military personnel and in accordance with the timetable agreed in Rome, was initially estimated to cost US \$260 million until the elections in October 1993.<sup>5</sup> The international donor community pledged \$760 million towards an economic recovery plan at a conference sponsored by the World Bank on 9–10 December 1992, and a week later the Italian Government issued a plea for \$402 million to support the demilitarisation and electoral process, as well as general emergency assistance requirements. The donor response was to provide \$308 million,<sup>6</sup> of which \$15 million was to be specifically directed to Renamo, a continuing bone of contention during the implementation of the peace agreement. Onumoz's initial budget, for the expenses incurred from the onset of its work until June 1993, was only approved on 15 March – the first of a series of delays in implementing the UN operation.<sup>7</sup>

## 2. *The UN Operation and Demilitarisation*

Onumoz was charged with structuring and implementing the demilitarisation of an estimated 63,000 Government and 20,000 Renamo troops.<sup>8</sup> Through the mechanism of the Cease-Fire Com-

<sup>4</sup> See Boutros Boutros-Ghali's address to the Security Council on the prospective United Nations mission to Mozambique, December 1992, in *United Nations Peace-Keeping Operations: Information Notes, 1993. Update No. 2* (New York), p. 87.

<sup>5</sup> 'Mozambique Accords Aid Relief Effort', in *Africa Recovery* (New York), December 1992–February 1993, p. 25.

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid.* pp. 25–6.

<sup>7</sup> Association of European Parliamentarians for Southern Africa (AWEPA), *Mozambique Peace Process Bulletin* (Amsterdam), 3, May 1993, p. 2.

<sup>8</sup> UN Office for Humanitarian Assistance Co-ordination (Unohac), 'Repatriation of Demobilized Soldiers', in *Mozambique Report* (Maputo), June 1993, p. 1.

mission and, bolstering its activities, the introduction of a large UN peacekeeping presence into the country, Onumoz was to act as guarantor of the cease-fire as well as the inviolability of the transportation network, and to assist in aspects of the demobilisation effort. These measures were to be followed by steps to bring about the complete demilitarisation of Mozambique, including the devotion of substantial resources to the process of reintegrating soldiers into society and to creating a new national army. The oversight of these latter procedures was put in the hands of the Onumoz Technical Unit for Demobilisation.

Underlying the decisions surrounding the demilitarisation programme was the recent UN experience in Angola. The elections there at the end of September 1992 were to have been the culmination of the lengthy peace process begun in 1988 with the signing of the New York accords outlining the conditions for the withdrawal of South African and Cuban troops from Namibia and Angola. The importance of the ensuing débâcle on the shape and scope of the prospective UN operation in Mozambique was highlighted by Boutros-Ghali for the benefit of the Security Council in December 1992: 'In the light of the recent experience in Angola, I believe it to be of critical importance that the elections should not take place until the military aspects of the agreement have been fully implemented.'<sup>9</sup>

The introduction of 7,500 UN peacekeeping troops was one of the consequences of the Rome agreement. Concern was high amongst Mozambique's landlocked neighbours, particularly Zimbabwe and Malawi, which had both committed troops in defence of the transportation links through the country, that the withdrawal of their forces – a condition insisted upon by Renamo's negotiators – would open their goods to banditry and sabotage. As such, they had insisted that the termination of their military presence along the Beira, Nacala, Tete, and Limpopo corridors (the National Highway was ultimately included as well) would be followed by the installation of UN peacekeeping forces.

The Cease-Fire Commission had the specific task of investigating alleged violations of the agreement to stop fighting that had been signed in Rome. In the first instance, a tripartite team consisting of members of Onumoz and representatives of both the Government and Renamo would try to find out what had happened in order to reach a consensual decision on an appropriate recommendation. If this proved

<sup>9</sup> 'Mozambique Accords Aid Relief Effect', loc. cit. p. 25.

to be impossible, then the Commission could send an Onumuz team to pass judgement on the alleged violation.<sup>10</sup>

The Technical Unit was given responsibility for the delicate set of procedures entailed in demilitarisation, and while this was heralded as one of Onumuz's innovations to peacekeeping, it really owed its origins to an initiative undertaken by the Swiss Government in 1991. The impending reduction in military assistance to Mozambique following both the policy changes in the Soviet Union and, ultimately, the collapse of the socialist states in Eastern Europe, sparked a financial crisis for the Frelimo régime.<sup>11</sup> All too well aware of the enervated condition of the economy, Mashid Osman, the Minister of Finance, sought to alleviate the problem by cutting defence spending.<sup>12</sup> After the Swiss had been asked for advice and assistance about how to reduce the country's armed forces, they produced a staged plan which called for the unilateral demobilisation of 45,000 soldiers and 6,000 employees of the Ministry of Defence to be organised through the *Gabinete de Reintegração*.<sup>13</sup>

The signing of the peace agreement in 1992 measurably changed the complexion of the situation in Mozambique, and UN officials hurried to integrate the Swiss plan into the general Onumuz mission. After Ton Pardoel, a veteran of the development assistance community in Mozambique, had been appointed as the Chief Technical Unit Officer, the Swiss plan was reshaped so that *all* soldiers would be fully demobilised before the campaign for votes commenced in order to avoid the disaster besetting Angola. In this manner, should the outcome of the elections be in doubt, whether due to accusations of fraud or a patent unwillingness to accept the outcome, neither side would be in a position to renew the conflict.<sup>14</sup>

In each of as many as 49 designated 'Assembly Areas' the Technical Unit aimed to place a team of three UN military officers and one civilian whose job was to organise, in conjunction with the local camp commander in charge of the demobilising soldiers, everything from their registration and disarmament to the storage of weapons, the

<sup>10</sup> Interview with Colonel Pier Segala, Cease-Fire Commission, Maputo, 14 September 1994.

<sup>11</sup> Richard Weitz, 'Continuities in Soviet Foreign Policy: the case of Mozambique', in *Comparative Strategy* (New York), 11, 1, January–March 1992, pp. 84 and 92.

<sup>12</sup> The commencement of negotiations with Renamo and the ending of *apartheid* in South Africa were cited as additional reasons for embarking on such measures according to Republic of Mozambique, 'A Demobilization and Reintegration Programme for Mozambican Military Personnel. First Phase, 1991–1992', Maputo, 25 May 1992, Annex 1, pp. iii–iv.

<sup>13</sup> *Ibid.* p. 1.

<sup>14</sup> Interview with Ton Pardoel, Chief Technical Unit Officer, Maputo, 26 May 1994.

monitoring of disputes, and the processing of those selected for the new national army. Provisions for the wives and children who took up residence at the edge of many of the camps were included in the development of the assembly areas. Recognising that the period of *cantonment*, while envisioned to last for no more than eight to ten weeks, was a crucial time to lay the foundation for the psychological reintegration of combatants into civilian life, the Technical Unit planned to both entertain and inform all concerned through a range of activities. These included literacy classes and football matches, as well as general information about the nature of the peace process and future opportunities through camp radio broadcasts and lectures. Finally, when the ceremony marking the official return to civilian status took place, it was the job of the Technical Unit team to co-ordinate with the Geneva-based International Organisation for Migration (IOM) for the transport of the ex-soldiers to their preferred destination.<sup>15</sup>

At the time of the peace agreement it had been envisaged that the new army would consist of 30,000 soldiers, equally divided between former Government and Renamo troops,<sup>16</sup> and that those selected would undergo instruction in an array of techniques and courses found in the curriculum of Western militaries. Britain, France, and Portugal agreed to staff training centres that would instil professionalism and a commitment to the new democratic state. Significantly, Onumoz had no representation on the Joint Commission for the Formation of the Mozambican Defence Force, where those nominated by the country's political parties interacted with key members of the international donor community.

### 3. *The UN Operation and Humanitarian Assistance*

Getting food, clothing, shelter, and medical treatment to the needy in Mozambique remained a principal task for Onumoz. With an estimated one million suffering malnutrition from the scourges of the most recent drought, not to mention the effects of war and severe economic dislocation, the immediate requirements of the emergency took precedence over all other aspects of humanitarian assistance. Apart from the need to pull together the numerous agencies already involved in this process, from the World Food Programme to the International Committee of the Red Cross, the abundance of land mines on many transport routes, as well as the reluctance of Renamo

<sup>15</sup> Technical Unit for Demobilisation, 'Demobilisation and Assembly Areas', Maputo, May 1994.

<sup>16</sup> *General Peace Agreement of Mozambique, 1992*, p. 30.

to give access to areas under its control, were hurdles to the ability of Onumuz to implement this component of its mission effectively.

The involvement of humanitarian assistance agencies in aspects of the demilitarisation process was a unique feature of the UN operation in Mozambique. Believing that there needed to be concrete prospects for the long-standing economic and social integration of the differing military forces into Mozambican society, Onumuz sought to ensure that the achievements of the protracted peace process were not lost after the elections. Hence the organisation of a variety of co-ordinated and imaginative activities, including food, shelter, medical treatment, vocational training, and literacy classes for encamped soldiers (and their dependents) awaiting demobilisation, followed by transportation to, and provision for long-term maintenance at, their preferred destination.

Repatriating refugees was a high priority, not least because of fears that the onset of peace would bring an uncontrolled influx of returning exiles, thereby putting a tremendous strain on the already stretched capacity of existing resources and institutions designed to cope with emergency situations. At the same time, hundreds of thousands of internally displaced persons, most of whom had fled from the wrenching civil war in the countryside, were likely to begin a spontaneous movement back to their abandoned homes. Apart from the hopelessly inadequate services in the rural areas, all those travelling either on foot and/or by vehicles on Mozambique's dilapidated roads, were imperilled by the prevalence of an estimated two million land mines. Obviously these needed to be swiftly located and either removed or blown up safely.

Recognising the complexity of introducing and managing their own humanitarian assistance programme, Unumuz planners decided to pool the resources of the dozens of non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and foreign development assistance projects (not to mention a few UN agencies) already at work in Mozambique. Given the recent experience in Cambodia of unnecessary friction between established NGOs and incoming UN agencies, efforts were made to foster a more productive rôle for the UN presence in Mozambique.<sup>18</sup> Moreover, by avoiding unnecessary duplication of responsibilities between all the agencies involved in humanitarian assistance, the proposed co-ordinating function would allow Onumuz to use the NGOs substantial

<sup>17</sup> Interview with Belrooz Sardy, Deputy Special Representative to the UN Secretary-General, Maputo, 14 September 1994.



knowledge of local conditions and the concomitant networks already in place, rather than devote precious time and resources to building these itself. As the NGOs had, to a certain degree, already developed a division of labour in their administration of humanitarian assistance both along functional and regional lines,<sup>18</sup> it was felt that the insertion of Unomoz into that process would merely serve to strengthen an existing operation.

The key agency involved, the UN Office for Humanitarian Assistance Co-ordination (Unohac), had been formally established at the international donors conference in December 1992 in terms of the Declaration on Guiding Principles for Humanitarian Assistance signed by the Government and Renamo earlier in the year.<sup>19</sup> Unohac was administratively under the control of the UN's Department of Humanitarian Assistance, based in Geneva, which acted on the recommendations of donors in creating an overall plan for resettling demobilised soldiers, repatriating refugees, and de-mining the country. Its consolidated humanitarian assistance programme for the period May 1993 to April 1994 budgeted US \$560 million towards the fulfilment of these tasks. At the heart of Unohac's effort was to be an administrative structure, replicated at both national and provincial levels, that would oversee both the introduction of emergency assistance into the rural areas and manage the long-term elements of the demobilisation process; namely, the Information Referral Service and the Reintegration Support Scheme. Their members were to be integrated into the actions taken by the Commission for Reintegration (Core), established by the Rome agreement and composed of representatives from the Government, Renamo, and several Western powers, as well as South Africa, and chaired by the UN.

Unohac's central office in Maputo provided overall co-ordination of the ever increasing humanitarian efforts, helped by the establishment of field offices in all 11 provinces, whose staff, along with Government and Renamo officials, organised the various aspects of the assistance programme. This arrangement proved to be particularly valuable as a forum for the reintegration of the separate administrative areas (territory controlled by either the Government or Renamo) which had been given official recognition by the peace agreement. The field offices also served as a good two-way conduit of information on conditions in the provinces, allowing Unohac to set up Mozambique's first truly comprehensive data base on a host of vital statistics on the population.

<sup>18</sup> Joseph Hanlon, *Mozambique: who calls the shots?* (London, 1991), pp. 190–219.

<sup>19</sup> Unohac, 'Consolidated Humanitarian Assistance Programme for 1994', Maputo, May 1994, p. 1.

In carrying out its mandate, Unohac sought to utilise the functional expertise and local knowledge of several agencies which traditionally worked in the field of humanitarian assistance. The first priority was to resettle those Mozambicans who had fled in large number to Malawi (1,058,500), South Africa (250,000), Zimbabwe (137,900), Zambia (25,400), Swaziland (24,000), and Tanzania (20,000), where the UN High Commissioner of Refugees (UNHCR), as well as a plethora of NGOs, had invested millions of dollars in creating refugee camps.<sup>20</sup> The IOM was contracted to arrange the transportation of demobilised soldiers and their families, and the World Food Programme was employed to provide foodstuffs for the assembly areas. As for long-term assistance to ex-combatants, Unohac turned to the experienced United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) to organise the Reintegration Support Scheme in partnership with the Ministry of Finance, while the IOM worked with Core in creating the Information Referral Service. Finally, as regards the crucial need for the country to be 'de-mined', Unohac entered into what proved to be the rather lengthy process of contracting this dangerous work out to suitable companies or development agencies.

#### 4. *The UN Operation and Elections*

The rôle of the UN in the elections in Mozambique was to resemble its position in other post-conflict situations – that is to say, it would monitor the registration of voters and the conduct of the campaign, as well as the casting and counting of votes in order to guarantee the validity of the outcome. As in Angola (and elsewhere), Onumoz would – along with a host of other institutions such as the Commonwealth and the European Union – provide observers whose rôle would be to verify the different aspects of the electoral process.

According to the peace agreement, the President was to be elected for a five-year term on the basis of a simple majority (or second ballot, if necessary), and the 250 members of the National Assembly were to be selected for a five-year term on the basis of proportional representation. The Mozambicans themselves, through the National Election Commission, would not only administer the logistical components of the whole democratic process, including the education and registration of voters, the establishment of polling stations, and the counting of votes, but also create a legal framework conducive to electioneering, *inter alia* assuring that all the officially registered parties

<sup>20</sup> Ibid. p. 38, and United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), 'Mozambique: repatriation and reintegration of Mozambican refugees', Geneva, May 1993, p. 1.

had equal access to the media. Obviously Onumoz officials were in a position to advise and influence the conduct of this critical final stage in the peace process.

### 5. *The Rôle of Other Commissions*

A number of other institutions were designated to be created by the peace agreement although their composition did not, by common consensus, include any Onumoz representation. The National Information Commission was to monitor the conduct and activities of the Government's security and information services with regard to political rights, and the National Police Affairs Commission was to monitor the conduct and activities of the police. Both bodies were to consist of representatives from the Government and Renamo, as well as nine others jointly agreed upon by the other political parties and the President. Finally, the National Commission on Territorial Administration would facilitate co-operation between the Government and Renamo on areas administered by the latter, especially with regard to access during the electoral campaign.

## THE UN IMPLEMENTATION OF THE GENERAL PEACE AGREEMENT

With the structures of Onumoz coming together, the implementation phase of the UN operation in Mozambique could begin. Problems ranging from the interpretation of the protocols of the peace agreement to outright obfuscation of the whole process – issues thought to have been resolved with the signing in Rome – continued to cause significant delays. Compounding these difficulties were inter-agency squabbles within the UN system, inadequate or inappropriate bureaucratic procedures by key agencies which hindered implementation, and a host of unexpected developments.

### 1. *The Politics of the Peace Support Operation*

Although the 1992 peace agreement had called for the introduction of a UN presence in Mozambique almost immediately, it took nearly six months before Onumoz was actually established. Underlying the delay was a combination of intransigence on the part of the two sides in Mozambique, the difficulties in obtaining a Status of Forces agreement with the Government, and the generally slow pace which seems to

accompany the formation of UN operations of this type. Thus, the withdrawal of foreign troops from the transport corridors, a precondition for the entire demilitarisation process, did not take effect until 15 April 1993. With Onumoz only fully operational two months later, the overall timetable as presented in the Rome agreement was clearly not feasible.

The lack of progress in Mozambique was explained to the Security Council by the Secretary-General, who outlined the problems being faced in implementing Onumoz's mission, including the delays surrounding the introduction of UN peacekeeping forces, and the continuing mistrust between the Government and Renamo. All of these factors were, according to Boutros-Ghali, the reason why the established timetable for the UN mission was 'unrealistic'.<sup>21</sup> The Security Council echoed his concerns in Resolution 818 (1993), which urged the Government and Renamo to comply with the terms of the peace agreement and to co-operate with the UN in Mozambique. As the deadline for the elections approached, Boutros-Ghali engineered an extremely important meeting between Afonso Dhlakama and Joaquim Chissano on 17–20 October 1993, and used this opportunity to hammer out a series of compromises with the recalcitrant parties.

It was agreed that the UN mission should be given 16 more months to complete its task. The new timetable called for the concentration of troops in the assembly areas to begin in September 1993 with full demobilisation completed by May 1994; the transportation home of demobilised soldiers to begin in October 1993 and to end by April 1994; the new army to be established in May and be fully operational by September 1994; voter registration to commence in April 1994 and be completed in June 1994; and the elections to take place in October 1994. Continuing concerns within both the Security Council and the international donor community about the slow progress in implementing the peace agreement caused the Security Council to adopt Resolution 898 (1994) in February, linking the introduction of over 1,000 UN police with the withdrawal of Onumoz on 15 November 1994.<sup>22</sup>

Neither the Government nor Renamo were, as events demonstrated, fully reconciled to the spirit of the agreement that they had signed in Rome, and both found cause to obfuscate in the Supervision and Control Commission on the details of implementing the needed

<sup>21</sup> *UN Peace-Keeping Operations ... Update No. 2*, 1993, p. 74.

<sup>22</sup> This UN withdrawal date was confirmed in Security Council Resolution 916 (1994) in May.

programmes for demilitarisation, de-mining, and the elections. It was apparent from the outset that Renamo was nowhere near prepared to engage in the responsibilities incumbent upon it as partner in the peace process, from politicking on committee structures to the complexities of conducting an electoral campaign.<sup>23</sup> Although insisting that Renamo should receive the \$15 million promised in Rome to facilitate its transformation from a military to a political organisation, Dhlakama was reluctant to take up residence in Maputo, and have Renamo officials sit on the various bodies governing the peace process. He called for the withdrawal of 65 per cent of foreign soldiers *before* beginning to concentrate Renamo troops in the assembly areas, which he had been unwilling to identify for demobilisation in spite of the phased introduction of the programme agreed upon in January 1993 at a meeting of the Supervision and Control Commission.<sup>24</sup> Renamo's three months boycott of this and other bodies, which only ended in June 1993, significantly stalled the peace process.

Compounding these problems was the fact that the Rome agreement had acknowledged the existence of 'dual administration' in the country – that is to say, separate territorial zones of control by either the Government or Renamo.<sup>25</sup> The latter strengthened its own apparatus to extract local taxes and to sell concessions to foreign businessmen, as well as to control the movement of the inhabitants. Everything from the location of the assembly areas to the disbursement of humanitarian assistance was adversely affected since the agreed-upon mechanism for reconciling problems in this area, the Commission on Territorial Administration, had not been created. This problem was only resolved in September 1993, when Dhlakama and Chissano decided that each provincial administration should be allocated three Renamo advisers in exchange for recognising the authority of existing governors.<sup>26</sup>

Having been given responsibility for the overall implementation of the peace agreement, the Supervision and Control Commission was the instrument for the settlement of disputes between the parties. As chairman, the Special Representative could mediate conflicts, initiate contingency plans, and urge compliance upon both the Government and Renamo, but he did not have the authority to compel them to

<sup>23</sup> According to *Mozambique Peace Process Bulletin*, 3, May 1993, p. 1, Renamo sent 45 of its officials to a month-long seminar at its headquarters in Maringue during March 1993.

<sup>24</sup> 'Mozambique Accords Aid Relief Effort', loc. cit. p. 26.

<sup>25</sup> See *General Peace Agreement of Mozambique, 1992*, Protocol 5, p. 54.

<sup>26</sup> The advisers were only selected in December 1993 and took up their posts in March 1994.

implement the Rome agreement fully. Furthermore, given the UN's stated commitment to the conclusion of the peace process in accordance with a specific timetable, it was not long before the Mozambicans were using this as a bargaining chip to extract concessions from the UN and the international donor community.

Bureaucratic wrangling, involving everything from in-fighting over 'turf' issues to paralysis over procedures, played a significant part in the character of Onumoz. While this could be expected in any large undertaking, and certainly amplified in the case of an operation of the magnitude found in Mozambique, there were several indications that these highlighted the existence of important problems in both the structure and the manner in which UN peace support operations were carried out. In particular, the overlap in terms of mandate fuelled inter-agency conflicts over everything from the securing of lucrative contracts to implementing their provisions, while a narrowness of interpretation frequently prevented agencies from fulfilling aspects of the peace process which would seem to logically fall within their purview. In addition to incompatible bureaucratic procedures in such key areas as accounting, trust fund management, and the allocation of resources, institutional prohibitions on working with non-state bodies was an obstruction to UN action in Renamo areas. Further compounding the situation were the clumsy and slow procurement procedures which, while designed for maximum 'transparency', did not lend themselves to the quick and successful implementation of a massive mission in support of peace.

To facilitate good working relations with the donor community, the Special Representative made a point of regularly meeting representatives of key agencies.<sup>27</sup> This not only served to advance the goals of Onumoz, but also provided an alternative forum from the structures created by the Rome agreement which continued to give international donors an unprecedented and direct rôle in the conduct, management, and policy-making of the country. There is no doubt that the financiers of various Onumoz projects increasingly influenced aspects of the peace process by scrutinising the budgetary implications of committee decisions. This attitude permeated the Security Council, which was to resist efforts to change the date of the elections a second time, and ultimately obliged Boutros-Ghali to link the introduction of a UN police force with the withdrawal of the UN presence from Mozambique.

<sup>27</sup> Interview with Aldo Ajello, Special Representative to the UN Secretary-General, Maputo, 16 September 1994.

## 2. *Demilitarisation*

The first component of the demilitarisation programme was to bring in UN peacekeeping forces to monitor the phased pull-out of Zimbabwean and Malawian troops along the transport corridors which cut across Mozambique. Apart from Renamo's aforementioned insistence that 65 per cent should be withdrawn *before* any concentration of soldiers for demobilisation could commence, it was not until February 1993 (with the original deadline already passed) that 16 countries had agreed to supply the UN with most of the soldiers that it needed.<sup>28</sup> Even then the Government's reluctance to allow them the usual freedom of movement and immunity from local taxation and import duties was a major problem.<sup>29</sup> According to Ajello, although Onumoz only wanted what the 'UN enjoys everywhere it has peacekeeping forces',<sup>30</sup> the draft agreement submitted in late February was neither acknowledged nor acted upon by the Government until mid-April, and not finalised until the following month.

In the end, it was only in August 1993 that 6,000 UN peacekeepers were eventually deployed.<sup>31</sup> Thereafter, their unwillingness to act beyond a narrowly defined sense of their mission – that is to say, for example, to pursue incidents of criminal behaviour in the Beira corridor – was criticised by both NGOs and local inhabitants. Coupled with this was a growing public perception that some elements were behaving in a manner that was far from professional. At its most extreme, allegations that some UN troops were involved in child prostitution threatened to develop into a major scandal. The accusations were initially denied but, after receiving confirmation of certain actions, Onumoz officials disciplined and removed the offending units. At the same time, it should be pointed out that the uneven preparation of different national armies for the special rigours of a UN peacekeeping mission – including the use of youthful conscripts – mediated against the maintenance of proper conduct the longer the soldiers stayed in Mozambique.

Linked to the installation of the UN peacekeeping forces was the monitoring of the cease-fire between the Government and Renamo. As it transpired, the overwhelming majority of violations concerned the

<sup>28</sup> 'Mozambique Accords Aid Relief Effort', loc. cit. p. 26.

<sup>29</sup> According to *Africa Confidential* (London), 34, 10, 14 January 1993, p. 8, the Government was reluctant both to lose the estimated \$1 million a day collected from the UN and to have Onumoz monitor its troop movements. <sup>30</sup> *Mozambique Peace Process Bulletin*, 3, May 1993, p. 4.

<sup>31</sup> 'Keeping the Peace or Disturbing It: UN humanitarian military intervention in Mozambique', Maputo, September 1993, p. 4.

movement of troops rather than accusations of shooting incidents or attacks.<sup>32</sup> The principal exceptions to this were controversies in Salamanga, one of the most southern areas in Mozambique, where Renamo was declared to have violated the cease-fire, and in Tete province, where the Government drove Renamo forces out of an illegally occupied area.<sup>33</sup> This constant shifting of soldiers from one location to another represented each side's anticipation of and/or response to developments in the peace process, especially with regard to demobilisation and the forthcoming elections. The separation of armed forces, as provided for in the 1992 Rome agreement, had been in effect abandoned as its implementation would have further stalled the peace process.<sup>34</sup>

Several factors conspired to make the planned demobilisation of Government and Renamo troops very problematic. In the first instance, the actual location of the assembly areas was a source of contention. Since both sides sought to retain effective control of territory, the selection of concentration centres was made on a strategic basis which ignored such simple logistical criteria as proximity to roads or water for the camps,<sup>35</sup> factors that were to contribute to a later outbreak of disturbances amongst disgruntled soldiers. In the end it was not until 30 November 1993 that 20 of the 49 assembly areas were officially opened to receive troops, and the others became operational three months later. An additional difficulty concerned the Government's paramilitary forces, estimated to number 155,000 and not adequately addressed in the peace agreement. They were scattered across the rural areas, often only nominally under the authority of district or provincial officials, and it was not until January 1994 that they actually began to disarm, with two-thirds demobilised by July.<sup>36</sup>

Substantial delays occurred in selecting the soldiers who were to join the new national army. Those registered at an assembly area should have had their papers sent immediately to the appropriate military authorities in the expectation that the lists of those successfully scrutinised for assignment to the new army would be sent back to the Onumuz team in the assembly area. In fact, the Government, and to a lesser extent Renamo, took a considerable amount of time to execute

<sup>32</sup> Colonel Pier Segala, Maputo, 14 September 1994.

<sup>33</sup> *Mozambique Peace Process Bulletin*, 5, August 1993, p. 5.

<sup>34</sup> Ton Pardoel, Maputo, 26 May 1994.

<sup>35</sup> Unohac, 'Demobilization Update', in *Mozambique Report*, August 1993, p. 6. For example, the site of the Nhamagua Assembly Area was not near any potable water.

<sup>36</sup> Renamo officials were particularly concerned about the Government's expanding Rapid Intervention Force which, like its Angolan counterpart, included numerous ex-soldiers.



such procedures. It gradually became apparent that a major cause of the hold-up was the fact that officials in the Ministry of Defence had deliberately over-estimated the size of the Government's armed forces for years, and on that basis had pocketed a considerable amount of money in redundant salaries for non-existent soldiers. Unable to account for the reduced numbers of troops, Ministry officials were eventually obliged to adjust their figures downwards to 49,638 men in arms.<sup>37</sup> Another delay was caused by the clandestine winnowing of Renamo's notorious 'child soldiers', who had been abducted in their hundreds and forcibly incorporated into the guerrilla army. Assisted by the International Committee of the Red Cross, the Save the Children Fund, and the United Nations Children's Fund (Unicef), their repatriation back to their villages proceeded the opening of Renamo territory to general access.<sup>38</sup>

During this lengthy period, the situation in the assembly areas worsened measurably. Government and Renamo troops, stripped of their weaponry but confined to the monotony of camp life, began to chafe at the slowness of demobilisation. Matters were complicated by the fact that Renamo commanders had made elaborate promises to induce soldiers to surrender to the peace process, including assurances of favourable conditions in the camps, substantial remuneration, and the expectation of a rapid return to their homes.<sup>39</sup> Confronted with the prolonged absence of pledged goods, troops began to stage a series of disturbances that typically involved attacking UN officials and/or taking them as hostages, blocking major roads in the assembly areas, and looting in neighbouring towns.<sup>40</sup> Mediation efforts by Onumoz, often involving flying the top officials of each side into the camps, did not always quell the disturbances – in some cases, Renamo 'generals' found themselves the victims of assault by disgruntled troops, and the introduction of Government police or soldiers occasionally resulted in injuries or death. By September 1994, 37 reported incidents had occurred in Renamo and 40 in Government assembly areas.<sup>41</sup>

<sup>37</sup> *Mozambique Peace Process Bulletin*, 10, July 1994, p. 2.

<sup>38</sup> *The Sunday Times* (London), 6 November 1994. Only 3,632 child soldiers were, in fact, discovered at Renamo bases, although it was clear to UN military observers that many soldiers were only just above the internationally sanctioned age of 15.

<sup>39</sup> Interview with Major Esko Blanksvard, Military Observer, and Bengt Svensson, Technical Unit Co-ordination Officer, Chimoio Assembly Area, 1 June 1994.

<sup>40</sup> Cease-Fire Commission, 'Problems/Incidents in Assembly Areas and Other Areas', Maputo, September 1994.

<sup>41</sup> *Ibid.* Interviews with Military Observers on 2 June 1994: Captain Daniel Rodrigues, Major Asaduzzaman, and Major Fernando Ferreira, Nhamagua Assembly Area. Also Military Observer, Catandica Assembly Area, and Antonio Lopes, Technical Unit Co-ordination Officer, Nhamagua Assembly Area.

In spite of achieving only a partial gathering of military forces in the assembly areas, it was decided the demobilisation should begin in March 1994. Four months later, 84 per cent (41,974) of Government troops were in *cantonment* and 90 per cent (17,402) of Renamo troops.<sup>42</sup> It was clear to Onumoz observers from the pattern of registration that both sides were withholding their crack troops and weaponry. However, with the deadline for demobilisation only weeks away, the prevarication on the part of the Government suddenly changed to cooperation and its 8,000 remaining troops were rushed to the assembly areas. Despite the logistical difficulties created by this mass influx, the Technical Unit and the IOM were able to complete their processing of the soldiers by 15 August, the final total of those registered being 64,130 (Government) and 22,637 (Renamo). None the less, both sides retained forces outside the demobilisation process – approximately 5,000 Government and 2,000 Renamo troops – as a hedge against post-electoral crises.<sup>43</sup>

The introduction of measures for the long-term maintenance of demobilised troops was taken up by Unohac (and as such, fell under the rubric of humanitarian assistance). They were to be provided with access to basic facts and figures about jobs, as well as aspects of the reintegration programme, by the Information and Referral Service. Originally falling under the auspices of Core (which did not prove to be effective), its 11 provincial offices were actually run by the IOM and received over 1,000 enquiries in the first six weeks of operation.<sup>44</sup> The Reintegration Support Scheme was to provide demobilised soldiers with 18 months of subsidies in the form of cash disbursements given at local branches of the *Banco Popular de Desenvolvimento*.<sup>45</sup> Using a Trust Fund administered by the UNDP, the aim was to provide ex-soldiers with reasonable assurance of financial support for an extended period of time, during which it was hoped they would find employment in their districts and, concurrently, integrate into the local community. The end result would be to cement the transition from the life of a soldier to that of a civilian. To assist in this process, the International Labour Organisation (under a sub-contract with UNDP) arranged for vocational kits consisting of agricultural tools, seeds, and food rations for up to three months to be given to demobilised soldiers when they left

<sup>42</sup> *Africa Confidential*, 35, 6, 18 March 1994, pp. 6–7, and *Mozambique Peace Process Bulletin*, 10, July 1994, p. 2.

<sup>43</sup> *Africa Confidential*, 35, 19, 23 September 1994, pp. 3–4.

<sup>44</sup> International Organisation for Migration (IOM) press release, Maputo, 24 May 1994.

<sup>45</sup> Each Government and Renamo soldier was to receive six months of their regular salary plus bonuses (with a minimum of 75,000 meticaïs) from the Government, half at the point of official demobilisation and half in the district of resettlement, and thereafter the UNDP was to provide a further 18 months of support.

their assembly areas. Additional provisions for long-term training programmes at the provincial level were called for by Unohac, albeit shelved due to resistance by the international donor community and elements in Onumoz.

The creation of the new national army, the *Forças Armadas de Defesa de Moçambique*, proved not unexpectedly to be contentious. The programme was officially inaugurated with the signing of the Lisbon declaration in July 1993, and gave Portugal, France, and Britain the leading rôle in this process. After a delay of several months (mainly due to problems of logistics) estimated to have cost \$1.6 million, 550 soldiers – half from the Government and half from Renamo – were sent to a camp in Nyanga, Zimbabwe, where British officers provided instruction on aspects of military training which the Mozambicans were expected to pass on their own troops back home.

However, continuing acrimony between the two sides, coupled with the slowness in identifying potential new recruits, threatened to paralyse the process. Aggravating the situation further was the fact that, despite the desire by the Government and Renamo leadership to have a large army, the vast majority of their soldiers wished to demobilise. Indeed, announcements that some were to continue serving in the armed forces often provoked rioting. In an effort to ameliorate these difficulties, the UN Secretary-General was given approval by the Security Council to allow his Special Representative to take up the chairmanship of the Joint Commission for the Formation of the Mozambican Defence Force. According to the Deputy Special Representative, the absence of sufficient incentives was a major explanation for the desire to leave the military, because a demobilised soldier received greater financial assistance (and had the option of finding a second income) than an infantry man in the new army.<sup>46</sup>

Agreement was reached in January 1994 that the *Forças Armadas* would be under the joint command of Lieutenant-Generals Lagos Lidimo (Government) and Mateus Ngonhamo (Renamo), and 80 top officers were appointed in June to head the newly created infantry battalions. Delays in the supply of new equipment and the renovation of inadequate training facilities, coupled with the prolonged process of identifying new soldiers, meant that their training had to be compressed into six weeks. Unhappiness over the prospects of being forced to continue in the military (many were clearly not volunteers), brought

<sup>46</sup> Interview with Belrooz Sardy, Maputo, 3 June 1993. There was little or no shortage of officers as the *Forças Armadas* offered them relatively high pay.

about strikes and desertions.<sup>47</sup> By the time the elections had started, less than 10,000 soldiers had completed their training, and there was talk of reducing the total in Mozambique's armed forces to 15,000.

### 3. *Humanitarian Assistance*

Initially conceived as an innovative attempt at identifying and co-ordinating existing expertise in the field, the UN humanitarian assistance programme was dogged by controversy. This principally manifested itself in friction between the international donor community, the NGOs, components of Onumoz, and the UN Office for Humanitarian Assistance Co-ordination (Unohac) over a range of practices and procedures which was, in the case of de-mining, to degenerate into public indictments and a breakdown of communication between the various parties.

The disbursement of food and medical assistance across rural Mozambique moved slowly at first. The *de facto* recognition of Renamo control over territory brought with it difficulties in reaching the population under its control, forcing Unohac and its constituent agencies to barter with officials over access. However, by November 1994 over 31,000 tons of food and 363,000 relief items, notably blankets, had been delivered to once restricted Renamo areas.<sup>48</sup>

Unohac's co-ordination function soon put it in conflict with the numerous humanitarian agencies already in place in Mozambique. Complaints as to the slow pace of action, as well as the tendency to support unduly costly solutions to problems, were compounded by a growing tendency to take action unilaterally on certain issues. There were also objections on the part of NGOs and donors alike to UN officials who were sometimes deemed to be too 'authoritarian' in their approach to organising the co-ordination of assistance. Nevertheless, concurrent with criticisms came commendations. Unohac's creation of a national data base on a range of statistics, pulling together information from the many development organisations operating in Mozambique, as well as that drawn from Onumoz structures, received high praise from all quarters.

Another problem facing Unohac was the performance of some of the sub-contracting agencies. The UNHCR had inaugurated a three-year \$230 million programme to bring back refugees from neighbouring countries, the main elements of which centred around the immediate

<sup>47</sup> *Mozambique Peace Process Bulletin*, 10 July 1994, p. 5.

<sup>48</sup> Unohac, *Consolidated Humanitarian Assistance Programme for 1993-94* (Maputo, 1993), p. 3.

need to rebuild basic services in Mozambique, to survey refugees to determine and organise their repatriation, to launch an educational campaign about land mines, complemented by the limited de-mining of transport corridors, and to assist in rehabilitating some areas that had offered asylum.<sup>49</sup> All of this was conducted against the background of negotiating tripartite agreements between each asylum country and the two main Mozambican parties, thereby following the standard procedures in international law governing repatriation programmes.

As it turned out, UNHCR plans did not keep pace with actual events. While officials were still negotiating the tripartite agreements and developing programmes with NGOs, the Mozambicans themselves began to return *en masse*. Approximately 150,000 refugees left Malawi of their own accord in the year following the signing of the Rome agreement, braving land mines and other transportation problems, as well as uncertainty about the capacity of their country to provide a decent livelihood.<sup>50</sup> By April 1994, as many as 1.5 million refugees had returned, about 40 per cent of the total. In addition, over two million internally displaced Mozambicans had spontaneously gone back to their homes,<sup>51</sup> half of the estimated total.

It was, however, the land mines which caused most difficulties for Unohac. In January 1993, after reaching agreement in the Supervision and Control Commission, Onumoz officials formally presented their de-mining programme: 2,000 kilometres of 'priority roads', deemed crucial for humanitarian assistance and the transport of repatriated refugees and demobilised soldiers, were to receive attention. Although a small company was contracted to begin work immediately on de-mining 636 kilometres in Sofala and Gaza provinces, its slow progress, partially due to delays in the disbursement of funding by international donors, resulted in less than half the designated roads being de-mined by December 1993.<sup>52</sup> Concurrently, conflicts within the Commission, principally motivated by Renamo's unwillingness to allow access to its areas of control, delayed formal approval of additional de-mining activities until November 1993.<sup>53</sup>

<sup>49</sup> UNHCR, *op. cit.* pp. 1–4.

<sup>50</sup> *Ibid.* p. 1.

<sup>51</sup> United Nations, 'United Nations Operation in Mozambique', New York, 1994, p. 94.

<sup>52</sup> Working in co-operation with Lonrho de Moçambique (Lomaco) and funded by the European Community, Gurkha Security Guards, Ltd, relied on hand clearance techniques so that only 178 kilometres of road were made safe by the time its contract ran out in January 1994. See Human Rights Watch/Africa, *Landmines in Mozambique* (Washington, DC, 1994), pp. 80–3; *Mozambique Peace Process Bulletin*, 10, April 1994, p. 7; and Unohac, 'An Integrated Mine-Clearance Training Programme', in *Mozambique Report*, February 1994, p. 6.

<sup>53</sup> *Landmines in Mozambique*, *op. cit.* p. 99, and Unohac, 'De-Mining Update', in *Mozambique Report*, August 1993, p. 8.

Further exacerbating these problems were aspects of the UN's sub-contracting process, involving everything from delays in shifting trust fund monies from the UN Department of Humanitarian Assistance in Geneva to UNDP, its sub-contractor agency, to conflicting accounting and procurement practices within UN agencies.<sup>54</sup> Unohac's desire to establish a Mine Clearance Training Centre, reflecting the belief that the entire process would take 20 years, ran into criticism from external donors both in terms of its conception and cost.<sup>55</sup> The end result of this lengthy process was that Unohac had spent millions of dollars without having cleared the majority of mines which were, in fact, in the rural areas along dirt paths and in fields, not on the designated 'priority roads'. Even the Secretary-General's Special Representative felt compelled to admit that the de-mining programme had been 'a disaster'.<sup>56</sup>

Nevertheless, in spite of some rather virulent and well-founded criticism, it needs to be emphasised in fairness that Unohac had only been established in December 1992. As such, it revealed what had been known to many close observers of the UN and, indeed, the subject of numerous internal reviews: that UN agencies are in many instances resistant to co-ordination, either due to conflicting mandates and/or confusing procedures.<sup>57</sup> Equally, it could be said that some of the structural problems in Onumuz were no more than a reflection of the condition of the overall UN system. The mission in Mozambique, in spite of the creation of Unohac, did not solve but merely underscored these problems.

#### 4. *The Police*

One aspect of the peace agreement which did not receive much attention was the rôle of the police, despite their crucial contribution (more so than the army) to the process of nation-building. As local representatives of the state they were expected to help guard the new order, not least through their non-partisan support of the electoral process.

<sup>54</sup> Interview with Felix Downes-Thomas, Director of the Office for Humanitarian Assistance Co-ordination, Maputo, 15 September 1994.

<sup>55</sup> 'De-Mining Update', loc. cit. p. 8. Initially, training of ex-soldiers as de-miners was envisaged by the UN, although the delays in starting the demobilisation process was a factor in bringing in foreign expertise.

<sup>56</sup> Aldo Ajello, 27 May 1994.

<sup>57</sup> Erskine Childers and Brian Urquhart, *Renewing the UN System* (Uppsala, Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation, 1994), pp. 142–70. For an early critique, see *Report of the Group of High-Level Intergovernmental Experts to Review the Efficiency of the Administrative and Financial Functioning of the United Nations* (New York, 1986).

The Mozambican police as constituted were ill-suited to take on that rôle, having earned a notorious reputation for corruption which cut across all political affiliations.<sup>58</sup> Having anticipated this problem, Boutros-Ghali had ensured that Onumoz could call for a team of 128 police officers if requested by the Mozambican parties. Ten months before the prospective elections were due to be held, it was clear that the time was ripe for the introduction of support for policing. Therefore, the Secretary-General requested in January 1994, with the acquiescence of the Government and Renamo, that the Security Council authorise Onumoz to expand its existing civil police component (Civpol). This was charged with monitoring police activities across the country, as well as providing technical assistance to the National Police Commission during the electoral campaign. Taking up positions in all strategic areas the 1,114 members of Civpol were to have unrestricted access in Mozambique so as to carry out their mission.<sup>59</sup>

Nevertheless, accusations of violations of civil and human rights continued to plague the Mozambican police. With its relationship to the National Police Commission confined to that of an adviser, the civilian police component of Onumoz was not in a position to act on violations of political and human rights or to compel the state to do so either. The frustration and ill-will between members of Civpol and their suspicious Mozambican counterparts was to hamper the fulfilment of the UN's policing mission.

## 5. *Elections*

The elections in October 1994, the stated culmination of the peace process, were subject to a number of near fatal postponements. In the first instance, the multi-party conference held in April 1993 was to have been the forum for the discussion and approval of the needed electoral law, but this collapsed in a hail of accusations, with Renamo and 12 other parties claiming that the Government had not given them adequate time to study the document.<sup>60</sup> Difficulties involving the

<sup>58</sup> Africa Watch, *Conspicuous Destruction: war, famine and the reform process in Mozambique* (Washington, DC, 1992), pp. 158–60. See also, *Amnesty International. Annual Reports* (London), 1987 to 1991.

<sup>59</sup> The plan was for 70 per cent of Civpol to be deployed during the registration of voters between April and June 1994, while the rest were to arrive in August.

<sup>60</sup> The 12 parties, outsiders to the General Peace Agreement and its elaborate committee system, demanded financial support for themselves. See 'Dicing with Democracy', in *Africa: South and East* (Yeoville, South Africa), June 1993, p. 11.

composition of the various district, provincial, and national electoral commissions, as well as the status of overseas voters, stalled further talks. It took the personal intervention of the Secretary-General in October 1993, and a subsequent intercession by the Special Representative in December, to finally re-start discussions. The legislation was passed by the National Assembly in December and took effect in January 1994. The newly established National Election Commission thereafter took up its duties and, with the assistance of foreign experts, began organising the coming elections.

The two-party political landscape which dominated the proceedings in Mozambique had, with the advent of the new democratic constitution in 1990 and the peace agreement two years later, developed into a panoply of 17 parties purporting to represent a range of interests.<sup>61</sup> Old political stalwarts and dissidents mingled with genuine democrats and outright opportunists to vie for votes and foreign financial assistance. The brevity of the actual campaign, coupled with difficulties in gaining access to the media and financial support, limited the viability of these parties.

Concurrently, with their attention fixed upon the disaster in Angola and concerned that Renamo would not honour the results of the elections, Western governments began to exert pressure upon Frelimo leaders to accept a Government of National Unity as in neighbouring South Africa. The US Under-Secretary of State for African Affairs, George Moose, declared that 'Where there's no tradition of a "loyal opposition", it's crucial to ensure the losers have a continuing stake in the democratic process, or else they will lose faith and start a new form of tyranny.'<sup>62</sup> But Frelimo's resistance to this arrangement, even in the face of the persuasive powers of Nelson Mandela, closed off this option.<sup>63</sup>

In spite of its narrowly defined rôle in the elections, Onumuz found itself increasingly involved in the mechanics of fostering democracy. Although all the emergent parties needed funds in order to pursue their political activities, Renamo presented a continuing source of difficulty in this respect. The UN's commitment to supporting what had been agreed in Rome, including the realisation of elections, meant

<sup>61</sup> It should be noted that President Chissano made changes to the ethnic composition of his Frelimo Government, which Renamo had always criticised as dominated by Shangaan, in order to broaden its appeal. *Africa Confidential*, 35, 6, 18 March 1994, p. 7.

<sup>62</sup> *Mozambique Peace Process Bulletin*, 5, August 1993, p. 4.

<sup>63</sup> Mandela visited Maputo in July 1994 and, reportedly at the request of Boutros-Ghali, tried (and failed) to convince Chissano to accept the formation of a Government of National Unity.



that it had an interest in not challenging Dhlakama when he made Renamo's actions in fulfilment of the terms of the peace agreement conditional upon obtaining funds for his organisation. It took Ajello's personal intervention with the international donor community to stave off the series of crises engendered by this issue.

Although the registration of voters did not commence until 1 June, afflicted by the delays hampering the whole electoral process, the response on the part of the Mozambican people was overwhelming, with over 5.2 million registering to vote.<sup>64</sup> The campaign, which officially started on 22 September, was conducted in an atmosphere of growing tension, deliberately nurtured by Renamo's declaration that it would view anything less than victory in key central provinces as a sure sign of electoral tampering; at the same time, contradicting himself, Dhlakama indicated on several occasions that he would respect the results of the elections.<sup>65</sup> In mid-October, 1,200 UN election observers arrived and, under the guidance of the Technical Unit (which had been seconded to organise the logistics of monitoring), were placed throughout Mozambique.

Despite a scare on the very eve of the elections, when Dhlakama temporarily pulled Renamo out of the process claiming fraud, the voting and counting proceeded smoothly. With approximately 85 per cent of the electorate participating, Chissano was elected President with 53 per cent of all votes cast as against 33 per cent for Dhlakama. As for the 250 seats in the National Assembly, 129 were won by Frelimo, 112 by Renamo, and 9 by *Unido Democrática*—none of the other parties broke the requisite 5 per cent ceiling set by the constitution to gain any representation.<sup>66</sup> Despite continuing objections from some politicians, blunted by the international community's acceptance of the results, as well as Renamo's inability to return to all-out warfare, the end of the long journey to peace seemed at last to have been realised.

#### CONCLUSION

With the completion of the elections, the culmination of the peace agreement, Onumoz began swiftly dismantling its presence in Mozambique as mandated by the Security Council. Ironically, the evacuation of thousands of personnel and tons of material, a substantial

<sup>64</sup> *Africa Confidential*, 35, 19, 23 September 1994, p. 3.

<sup>65</sup> *Weekly Mail & Guardian* (Johannesburg), 21–27 October 1994.

<sup>66</sup> *The Washington Post*, 11 November 1994, and *Mozambique Peace Process Bulletin*, 14, February 1995, p. 3.

and institutional feature of the landscape for two years, was itself a potentially destabilising event. Frelimo and Renamo, accustomed to the participation of the UN as both moderator and guarantor of the peace process, would now have to learn to conduct their political conflicts without recourse to direct and interested international support on the scale seen between 1992 and 1994. Chissano's refusal to allocate any provincial governorships to Renamo, in marked contrast to the conciliatory gestures of Mandela towards his opponents in South Africa, was an indication that difficulties could be expected in the future.

The overall expenses of Onumoz amounted to more than \$500 million, approximately one million dollars per day. The outlay on UN personnel was reportedly 57 per cent of the total spent from 15 October 1992 to 31 October 1993, and went up to 62 per cent between 1 November 1993 and 15 November 1994.<sup>67</sup> The highest costs were found in the maintenance of UN troops, at \$162 million of the second-year budget of \$328 million, arguably the least productive component of the entire operation.

Several of the numerous problems which emerged in Mozambique called into question the capacity of the United Nations to fulfil missions of this nature. The overall readiness to engage in such peace support operations was found in many instances to be wanting. Delays in introducing UN troops, partially due to the failure to secure immediately a Status of Forces agreement with the Government, were compounded by the reluctance of member-states to provide soldiers. The inter-agency conflicts, reflective of structural flaws in the UN system itself, also damaged the credibility of Onumoz. Although co-ordination and integration are common watchwords in the UN, competing bureaucracies and incompatible accounting procedures can actually endanger the lives of ordinary people. Poor procurement procedures meant that many materials had to be ordered through New York at often higher cost, and most certainly with a longer deployment time, than those available in local or regional markets. Greater autonomy in the field in this area, anathema to some members of the Security Council, would contribute to solving several of these difficulties.

The spectre of the Angolan débâcle undoubtedly hung over the entire UN operation in Mozambique and its conduct. The fact that the temporary withdrawal by Renamo from the elections threatened to

<sup>67</sup> Onumoz, 'Budget', Maputo, September 1994. This breakdown compares favourably with other peace support operations such as the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (Untac) or the United Nations Protection Force (Unprofor) in former Yugoslavia, where 80 and 70 per cent of their respective costs were administrative.

virtually destroy the final component of the 1992 agreement in Rome is a crude testimonial to the fundamental inability of the United Nations to completely control the resolution of conflicts of this nature. In the end, the verdict on the protracted peace process that incurred, perhaps inevitably, such a variety of extraordinary costs for both the international community and the Mozambican polity, depends on the quality and durability of peace in this corner of Southern Africa.